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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN M&A SITUATIONS - EVIDENCE FROM AFFILIATED 
ANALYSTS’ BEHAVIOUR SURROUNDING EUROPEAN M&A DEALS
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This thesis concentrates on studying conflicts of interests in merger and acquisition situations 
via analysts’ recommendations. I aim to describe the origins and consequences of conflicts of 
interest between different parties and to find out if there is empirical evidence on any of these 
conflicts of interests.
DATA
My sample consists of analysts’ recommendations about acquirer companies’ stock in 814 
merger and acquisition deals. The sample period is 1996-2006 and both acquirer and target 
are public European companies. There are a total of 6 278 recommendations in my sample of 
which 153 are target-affiliated analysts’ recommendations, 236 acquirer-affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations and 5 889 unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations. Analyst affiliation is 
classified according to advisor relationship so that both acquirer- and target-affiliation is 
considered separately. M&A data is gathered from SDC database and analyst 
recommendations data is collected from JCF database for institutional investors.
RESEARCH METHODS
The effects of affiliation, analyst report timing, and deal specific and timing related variables 
on recommendations and recommendation revisions are studied by using ordered logistic 
regression. Additionally, summary and descriptive analysis is used to analyse the data.
RESULTS
My main results are related to the absolute recommendation levels. I find evidence that, in 
general, acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more high level recommendations about acquirer 
companies’ stock and that target-affiliated analysts issue more low level recommendations 
compared to unaffiliated analysts. In addition, deal value magnifies the bias in target-affiliated 
analysts’ recommendations. My results suggest in addition, that acquirer-affiliated analysts 
issue more low level recommendations and target-affiliated analysts more high level 
recommendations for stock deals with at least 50 % stock financing than for my all deals 
sample. However, the low level recommendations issued by acquirer-affiliated analysts seem 
to concentrate on quarters -2 and -3 prior the deal announcement other quarters having more 
high level recommendations. These results are confirmed by my analysis on recommendation 
revisions. Additionally, my results imply that both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts issue 
lower level recommendations after the European regulation change in 2003.
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1.1. Background and motivation
“Our objective... is to adopt a policy, fully understood by the entire firm, including the 
Research Department, that we do not make negative or controversial comments about our 
clients as a matter of sound business practise.”
(Morgan Stanley internal memo, published in the Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1996)
As can be seen from the citation from Morgan Stanley’s internal memo above, conflicts of 
interest seem to be present in the investment banking industry. In fact, the stock market crash 
of 2000-2001 triggered concerns that investors were misled by analysts’ biased research. The 
critics were able to recognise a distinct lack of independence in affiliated analysts behaviour 
and questionable objectivity in affiliated analysts’ research. These findings resulted in 
changes in US regulatory environment beginning in July 2002. Finally, in December 2002, 
the Global Analyst Research Settlements involving ten US banks (later twelve), the SEC, the 
NYSE, the NASD and the New York Attorney General were formally announced. The 
Settlements led to increased disclosure requirements, organisational changes inside 
investment banks and penalties paid by the ten largest investment banks in the US.
The stock market crash resulted in regulatory changes in Europe as well. Commission of the 
European Community summoned a working-group to examine the matter. As a result, new 
directives were enacted that summoned similar regulatory changes and disclosure 
requirements as the Settlements in the US. In addition, guidelines for self regulatory actions 
and best practices were issued.
The Global Research Analyst Settlements spurred numerous studies in the US aimed to verify 
whether investment bank affiliated analysts had issued biased recommendations compared to 
unaffiliated analysts. Also the market reactions to the affiliated analysts’ recommendations 
were studied. However, the main body of these studies concentrated on companies issuing 
new securities (for example Michaely and Womack, 1999, Lin and McNichols, 1998 and 
Lungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm, 2003) and, to the best of my knowledge, there are only 
couple of studies concerning merger and acquisition (M&A) situations; Kolasinski and
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Kothari working paper (2007) and Bradley et al. (2007) study. Results on the conflicts of 
interest are mixed in the two papers mentioned.
Nevertheless, investment banking relationship generates conflicts of interest in M&A 
situations as well. Bradley et al. (2007) argue that the conflicts of interest inherent to M&A 
advisors may differ from IPO and SEO underwriters because of different fee structures' and 
higher deal frequencies compared to the underwriter context. In addition, Bradley et al. (2007) 
report that aggregate fees for M&A deals have exceeded equity issuance fees for every year 
for the past decade thus making the M&A deals an important source of income for the 
investment banks. Additionally, the probability of gaining repetition business is obviously 
larger in M&A context than in IPO markets, which adds a competition perspective in every 
implemented M&A deal. Due to the fact that shares of acquiring firms are mostly public 
before the transactions, studying M&A situations enables one to compare the 
recommendations issued ex-ante and ex-post the transactions which is not possible for IPO 
situations. This enables one to detect the possible strategic changes in affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations surrounding the M&A deal announcement.
Another source of conflicts of interest lays in the compensation structure of sell-side equity 
research analysts. Before the regulation changes, it was common for a significant part of the 
analysts pay to be related to the “helpfulness” to the bank’s corporate finance departments in 
finalising and winning corporate finance deals. In addition, superior quality of research and 
positive coverage from high reputation analysts are important competitive advantages for 
investment banks, since the importance of positive analyst recommendations to the 
performance of a stock has been proven in several studies stating that analysts’ 
recommendations have a significant impact on stock prices (for example, Panchenko 2007; 
Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, 2001).
Finally, it is a commonly known fact that M&A deals generally provide positive excess 
returns for target shareholders. According to Bradley et al. (2007), this creates a possible
1 According to McLaughlin (1990), investment bank fees concerning M&A deals are substantially contingent on 
offer outcome, giving investment banks significant incentives to complete a transaction. Further, provisions in 
target-firm contracts motivate bankers to seek a high price. I will discuss the subject more in detail in section
2.3.1.
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channel for affiliated analysts to generate value for their client investors by recognising these 
targets ex-ante. At the same time, affiliated analysts are able to enhance their reputation by 
exploiting inside information gathered via affiliation.
1.2. Research objective and questions
This thesis concentrates on studying conflicts of interests between investment banks, affiliated 
analysts, client firms, client firms’ shareholders and investing public in merger and 
acquisition situations via affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations issued 
surrounding M&A deal announcements. I aim to describe and specify the origins and 
outcomes of conflicts of interest between separate parties and to find out whether there is 
empirical evidence on any of these conflicts of interests, i.e. is there some kind of a consistent 
and common bias in affiliated analysts’ recommendations. M&A advisor relationship is used 
as a proxy for analyst affiliation. Table 1 presents my research questions.
TABLE 1.1 Research questions
Research Questions
1 fWhat kinds of conflicts of interest are present in M&A situations?
2) How are the potential conflicts of interest manifested in affiliated analysts’ recommendations about 
the acquirer?
3) Does the form of payment have an effect on affiliated analysts’ recommendations about the 
acquirer?
4) Does the report timing in relation to the M&A deal announcement have an effect on the 
recommendation level?
5) Did the regulatory environment changes in Europe affect affiliated analysts’ recommendations 
about the acquirer?
6) Is the potential bias in affiliated analysts’ recommendations different during high M&A volume
periods or bull markets? _______________
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1.3. Contribution and key results
Previous literature has mostly studied analyst affiliation and investment banking relationship 
in relation to security issuance cases. In addition, there is a vast literature about whether 
different employers, such as investment banks and independent brokerage houses, have an 
effect on analyst recommendations. These studies do not specify any special investment 
banking relationship but use the analysts’ employer as a proxy of conflicts of interest. To the 
best of my knowledge, and according to Bradley et al. (2007), there are only two studies 
(Kolasinski and Kothari, 2007 and Bradley et al„ 2007) that concentrate on analyst affiliation, 
conflicts of interest and investment banking relationship in M&A situations.
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) divide analyst affiliation to target- and acquirer-advisor related 
affiliation, as I do in my thesis. In addition, they divide their hypothesis according to the form 
of payment and analyst report publication time in relation to the M&A deal announcement. 
However, Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) consider the report publication timing merely as 
whether the recommendation has been published after the M&A deal announcement or not. 
Bradley et al. (2007) in tum divide the time surrounding M&A deal announcement to quarters 
as I do, but perform their regression analysis similarly to Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) only 
on time periods before and after M&A deal announcement.
In addition, Bradley et al. (2007) do not divide analyst affiliation to target- and acquirer- 
affiliation but define the affiliated analyst merely as an analyst whose employer is advising 
either one of the companies participating in the M&A deal. Hence my thesis is the first study 
that examines whether the recommendation issuance quarter has an effect on affiliated 
analyst’s recommendations and how the relationship with either target or acquirer firm affects 
the analysts’ recommendations during different quarters. My results suggest that the report 
issuance quarter might have an effect on both recommendation levels and recommendation 
revisions.
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) studied changes in relative recommendations, i.e. 
recommendation revisions. Bradley et al. (2007) in tum study relative recommendations. 
However, it is argued, (Agrawal and Chen, 2007) that it is the retail investors whose 
investment decisions are mostly affected by the absolute recommendation levels and that
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sophisticated institutional investors do not react to the absolute recommendation levels but 
follow more the recommendation revisions. Thus the possible bias in absolute 
recommendation levels might be less likely detected. Hence in addition to studying the 
revisions. I study also absolute recommendation levels and relative recommendations. The 
main findings in my thesis are related to the absolute recommendation levels and I find 
evidence that even though the affiliated analysts’ revisions do not seem to deviate statistically 
much from those of unaffiliated analysts, their absolute recommendation levels deviate from 
unaffiliated analysts’ recommendation levels. In addition, my results suggest that the direction 
of the deviation is dependent on the advisor relationship. Target-affiliated analysts tend to 
issue lower level recommendations and acquirer-affiliated analysts higher level 
recommendations about the acquirer’s stock. This result on absolute recommendation levels 
has not been reported by either Bradley et al. (2007) or Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) but 
confirms the results on recommendation revisions reported by Kolasinski and Kothari (2007).
I present and study additional hypotheses to both Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) and Bradley 
et al. (2007) studies. Firstly, I study the effects of the European regulatory changes and 
increased investment bank competition during high M&A deal volume periods. Secondly, I 
use variable for Top 15 banks to proxy for analyst and bank reputation effects. Thirdly, I 
include a hypothesis considering target-affiliated analysts’ behaviour in hostile deals, since 
according to McLaughlin (1990, 1992) investment bank fee contracts encourage banks to 
increase the deal value and completion probability also in hostile deals. Finally, a hypothesis 
of analysts’ own ambitions and reputation building is also included in my thesis since analyst 
reputation is seen as a key factor in analyst compensation. Affiliated analysts may gamer 
inside information about the M&A deal before its publication which could help them to issue 
more precise recommendations and to enhance their reputation.
I find evidence that both unaffiliated and affiliated analysts’ recommendations issued after the 
European regulation changes in 2003 are of lower level than the recommendations issued 
before the recommendation changes which is in line with Kadan et al. (2008) findings on US 
data. However, I have a differing finding considering the recommendation scales. In the US 
study, the information content of analysts’ recommendations has diminished after the 
regulation changes since analysts converted their recommendation scale from five categories 
to three following the regulation changes in year 2002. Similar effect can not be seen in my 
data since European analysts still use five category recommendation scales. This finding is
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interesting since the new regulatory frameworks are quite similar in both continents. Results 
for my hypotheses related to high M&A volume period suggest that other than affiliated 
analysts issue higher recommendations during high M&A volume market periods. Supporting 
evidence for hypotheses considering bank and analyst reputation and hostile deals is not 
provided.
In addition, I find results suggesting that both acquirer- and target-affiliated analysts issue 
lower level recommendations prior the deal announcement especially in stock financed deals. 
Hence evidence suggesting that acquirer-affiliated analysts may aim to improve their own 
reputation is provided. However, my results for analysts’ report timing in relation to the M&A 
deal announcement suggest that the acquirer-affiliated analysts’ lower level recommendations 
are concentrated on quarters -3Q and -2Q prior the deal announcement and recommendations 
issued during other preceding quarters are of a higher level. Thus my results suggest that 
acquirer-affiliated analysts issue higher level recommendations closer to the deal 
announcement date which provides evidence for acquirer-affiliated analysts’ strategic 
recommendation behaviour even though the results remain mixed. Likewise evidence for 
target-affiliated analysts’ strategic recommendation behaviour is provided.
In addition to the issues discussed above, I present a comprehensive review on the motives 
and reasons behind conflicts of interest in M&A deals. The combination of investment 
banking fees and new regulations into the other M&A related conflicts of interest issues is 
unique compared to the existing literature.
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1.4. Definition of key concepts
1.4.1. Analyst affiliation and sell-side analyst
I divide analyst affiliation to target- and acquirer-affiliation according to the advisor 
relationship. Analyst affiliation refers to a situation where a sell-side analyst, employed by an 
investment bank acting as an advisor in an M&A deal, gives recommendations on the 
investment bank’s client or the opposite party in the deal. Thus the analyst is commenting on 
a company that is participating in an M&A deal in which his or her employer is acting as an 
advisor. For example, an analyst is target-affiliated if his employer is acting as the target’s 
advisor in an M&A deal and the analyst issues a recommendation about the acquirer 
company’s stock.
Sell-side analysts are analysts who typically work for investment banks, brokerage houses or 
independent research companies and analyse firms in order to provide information for their 
clients. The tasks of a sell-side analyst consist of providing accurate, reliable, current and 
timely forecasts and recommendations about the firms he or she is following. Buy-side 
analysts in turn work for institutional investors and target their analysis in finding firms to 
invest in and their analyses are aimed for internal use only. This thesis concentrates on sell- 
side analysts, and the term “analyst” is therefore used to designate a sell-side analyst in the 
remainder of the thesis.
1.4.2. Analyst opinion level
This thesis concentrates on reported recommendation levels and revisions in stead of forecasts 
about the company’s EPS or other financial figures. The recommendation levels are classified 
as follows. Analysts issue usually recommendations in five categories in my sample: “Strong 
buy”, “Buy”, “Hold”, “Sell” and “Strong sell”. These categories are converted into numbers, 
so that “Strong buy” is number 5 and “Strong sell” is number 1. The term “positive” or 
“optimistic” recommendation is used for categories “Strong buy” and “Buy” and “negative” 
or “pessimistic ” recommendation refers to categories “Strong sell” and “Sell” in this thesis.
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1.4.3. Conflicts of interest
There are several definitions to the term “conflicts of interest”. Some sources narrow conflicts 
of interest down to situations where one party is in a position of trust or has fiduciary duties. 
For example, West’s Encyclopaedia of American Laws, defines conflicts of interest as “A 
term used to describe the situation in which a public official or fiduciary who, contrary to the 
obligation and absolute duty to act for the benefit of the public or a designed individual, 
exploits the relationship for personal benefit, typically pecuniary.”
However, conflicts of interest are present in situations where there is no such absolute duty to 
act for the benefit of certain beneficiary, and another definition of conflicts of interest can be 
found from Wikipedia, that says the following: “A conflict of interest rises from a situation 
where professional or corporation (private or governmental) is in a position to exploit a 
professional or official capacity in some way to their personal or corporate benefit.” Mehran 
and Stulz (2006), define conflicts of interest more loosely, and according to them conflicts of 
interest exist when a party to a transaction could possibly take gains by taking actions that are 
harmful to the other party in that transaction.
Aforementioned definitions are similar in that all of them define conflicts of interest as a 
situation rising from the possibility of other party to take a direct gain by taking actions that 
have an adverse effect on the other party. Another relating factor in the definitions above is 
that the other party is defined as being able to gain from having relatively more information 
than the other party. Thus one reason behind conflicts of interest is asymmetry ofinformation.
According to Mehdan and Stulz (2006), the main reason behind conflicts of interest in 
transactions involving financial institutions is information asymmetry. In many transactions 
financial institutions are better informed than their customers. The asymmetry of information 
is a fertile ground for conflicts of interest since whenever two parties transact, each party tries 
to maximise its gain from the transaction. Mehdan and Stulz (2006) argue, that when both 
parties have full information about the attributes of the good being transacted, when that 
information is fully available and when contracting is costless, there is no room for conflicts 
of interest. In the absence of full information, verifiability and costless contracting, conflicts 
of interest are omnipresent.
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However, if the buyer is rational, she can perceive the seller’s objective to benefit form the 
transaction and thus the buyer will enter the transaction only at a price that is advantageous 
enough to cover the risks associated with conflicts of interest. As a result, the seller, or at the 
situation of financial situations, the service provider ends up bearing the costs of conflicts of 
interest if the buyers are rational. Thus it can be stated that conflicts of interest entail indirect 
costs to the financial institutions and that the conflicts of interest generate incentives for 
financial institutions to reduce their impact on transaction as long as it is cost effective to do 
so.
With regard to the numerous studies written on the subject, it can be stated that the presence 
of conflicts of interest in the investment banking world is a well known fact. However, there 
is no consensus view on whether conflicts of interest have a systematic adverse impact on the 
customers of financial institutions. Furthermore, Mehran and Stulz (2006) argue, that there 
are important factors that mitigate the impact of conflicts of interest and that it is possible for 
financial institutions’ customers to benefit from the existence of such conflicts.
In previous studies, see for example Kolasinski and Kothari (2007), the investment banking 
advisor relationship is used as a proxy for analyst conflict of interest. I use the same proxy in 
my thesis.
1.5. Limitations of the study
My access to limited amount of affiliated analysts’ recommendations deteriorates the 
statistical power of my results. In addition, the fact that some analyst recommendations might 
be altered after their original issuance might cause bias in the results (see section 4.1.2.). 
Additionally, some results may result from selection bias in addition to affiliation which 
makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the results. For example, target-affiliated analysts 
might be selected due to their negative priors about the acquirer which results in negative 
recommendations surrounding the M&A deal announcement. The results on M&A high 
volume periods and Bull market periods need to be interpreted with caution since the time 
periods are overlapping.
11
1.6. Structure of the study
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents literature review. I 
begin the literature review by discussing the shareholder returns related to M&A deals. 
Analysts’ recommendations and conflicts of interest in them are discussed next. I conclude 
my literature review by discussing investment banking relationship, conflicts of interest and 
regulation changes. Chapter 3 presents my hypotheses and chapter 4 describes my data, 
methodology and variables. My results are presented in chapter 5, first for absolute 
recommendation levels, then for relative recommendations and finally for recommendation 
revisions. Chapter 6 presents the summary of my thesis and concludes. Also suggestions for 
future research are presented in section 6.
2. Literature review
2.1. Shareholder returns after M&A announcement
I start by presenting a short insight into M&A value generation literature to summarise the 
common shareholder return effects of M&A announcements. The literature is presented to 
enlighten the background of investment bank motives for generating biased research. As can 
be seen from the sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2., M&A announcements lead often to acquiring firm 
share value deterioration, which creates a situation where issuing biased research can be seen 
as favourable to an acquirer-client.
Mergers and acquisitions represent substantial reallocations of resources within and across 
industries. According to Andrade et al. (2001), this reallocation of resources provides firms a 
rare possibility to grow massively within a few months. Measuring the value creation or 
destruction and determining how this incremental value is distributed among target and 
acquirer shareholders has been the central objectives of recent merger research.
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2.1.1. Short-term announcement returns
In a market that is efficient with respect to public information, share prices should adjust 
quickly to reflect all relevant information. Thus it can be assumed that the entire wealth effect 
of a merger or an acquisition should be incorporated into stock prices by the time the 
uncertainty about the completion of the deal has resolved, i.e. at the time of deal completion. 
As a result, there exists a wide range of studies measuring the short-term returns on stock 
prices for the merger participants. According to Andrade et al. (2001), the most statistically 
reliable evidence on whether mergers or acquisitions create value for shareholders can be seen 
in traditional short-window event studies, where the average stock market reaction at merger 
announcement is used as a measure of value creation or destruction.
According to the main body of the studies concentrating on the short-term returns surrounding 
the announcement period, target shareholders seem to be clear winners in merger and 
acquisition transactions. For example, according to Andrade et al., (2001) the average three 
day abnormal return for target shareholders is 16 percent. This abnormal return is remarkably 
stable over time and industries in their sample.
The evidence for acquiring firm shareholders is not as rosy. In Andrade et al (2001) sample, 
the average abnormal return is -0,7 percent for the shorter time period (-1,+1) and -3.8 percent 
for the longer (-20, closing date). Although the results are not statistically significant, they are 
in line with the previous research that has concluded that the acquirer shareholders seem to be 
subsidising the merger and acquisition deals. As a whole, mergers seem to generate value in 
Andrade et al. (2001) sample, since combined firm returns are positive following mergers and 
acquisitions, but the main gain seems to accumulate to the target shareholders. This is in line 
with previous studies as well.
One explanation for target shareholders’ abnormal returns exceeding acquirer shareholders’ 
returns may rise from the fact that mergers are carried out due to several different motives. 
Mergers resulting from managers’ empire-building behaviour may result in negative acquirer 
shareholder abnormal returns and Andrade et al. (2001) argue that if mergers could be sorted 
by true underlying motives, it might be that those which are undertaken for good reasons truly 
benefit acquirer shareholders as well but these gains are cancelled out by mergers undertaken 
for less benign reasons. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) provide similar results and argue that the
13
unsuccessful mergers are finally punished in the takeover market as well. These differing 
motives behind mergers apply for acquisition situations as well and result in conflicts of 
interest, most obvious one being the conflict between acquirer shareholders’ and 
managements’ best interest in a merger motivated by dubious reasons.
However, the combination of different mediums of payment biases the picture. In particular, 
mergers and acquisitions financed with stock have different value effects from purely cash 
financed mergers. According to Andrade et al. (2001), this is due to the fact that by financing 
a deal with stock, the acquiring company implicitly performs an equity issue in addition to the 
merger deal. On average, equity issues signal that a company sees its stock overvalued which 
causes its stock price to decline around -2 or -3 percents according to Andrade et al. (2001). 
This makes it important to separate the payment types when measuring returns to acquirer 
shareholders.
When mergers are divided according to payment types, Andrade et al. (2001) find in their 
study that the negative announcement period stock market reaction for acquiring firms is 
limited to those using stock financing in their deal. They find that acquiring firms that use at 
least some stock to finance the deal have reliably negative abnormal returns of-1,5 percent, 
while acquirers that refrain from equity financing have average abnormal returns of 0,4 
percent. In addition, in Andrade et al. (2001) study, also target shareholders gain higher 
abnormal returns when no stock financing is used. They find also that the combined average 
abnormal returns for stock financed mergers are zero where as the combined three-day 
abnormal return for cash deals is reliably positive at 3,6 percent.
The difference in abnormal shareholder returns stemming from the usage of stock financing 
creates a source of conflicts of interest. Since the use of stock as a medium of payment results 
in such a clear difference in shareholder returns, providing positive analyst coverage for 
acquirer-clients surrounding stock financed merger or acquisition deals might create a useful 
competitive advantage for investment banks.
The fact that acquirer shareholders seem to be suffering from, if not always negative, at least 
remarkably smaller positive abnormal returns compared to the target shareholders, suggests 
that it might be advantageous for investment banks advising acquirers in merger and 
acquisition situations to provide positively biased research. This could lead to the deal to
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appear better than average if the biased analyst recommendations were able to upgrade 
acquirer stock price. This could make the deal more probably accepted by both target and 
acquirer shareholders, which in turn would give higher probability of closing the deal and 
provide more reliable fee collection for the investment bank. In addition, affiliated analysts 
gamer inside information about the deal prior its announcement which enables them to 
anticipate the potential forthcoming acquirer share price deterioration and enhance their 
reputation for providing accurate research.
2.1.2. Long-term returns
Even though the traditional wisdom for many years stated that the announcement period stock 
price reaction should fully reflect the information effect of the deal, several studies 
concerning long-term returns for combined firms cast doubt on the short-term event window 
studies. According to these studies, investors systematically fail to assess quickly the full 
impact of corporate announcements. In fact, according to Andrade et al. (2001), some authors 
find that the long-term negative drift in acquiring firm stock prices overpowers the short-run 
positive effects of the deal, making the total wealth effect negative.
Again, firms using stock financing suffer from more negative returns than firms using merely 
cash in their deals. For example, according to Loughran and Vijh (1997), who calculate 
separately abnormal returns for stock and cash financed deals over the time period of 1970- 
1989, find that over time period of five years after the merger, acquiring firms using stock 
financing have abnormal returns of -24,2 percent while the abnormal return for cash financed 
deals is 18,5 percent. Another grouping generating different returns is book-to-market equity 
ratio. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) calculate high book-to-market firms three-year abnormal 
returns of -17,3 percent for low book-to-market firms and 7,6 percent for high book-to-market 
firms for the period of 1980-1991.
To sum up, according to Andrade et al. (2001) and other studies, mergers generate positive 
shareholder value that seems to be allocated mainly to the target shareholders. This uneven 
allocation creates a situation where positively biased analyst research could benefit an 
acquirer-client if analyst’s recommendations have a positive effect on acquirer’s share price.
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2.2. Analyst recommendations and conflicts of interest
The previous literature concerning affiliated analysts and conflicts of interest usually 
discusses two questions. Firstly, do affiliated analysts issue more positive recommendations 
compared to unaffiliated analysts and secondly, how does the performance of affiliated 
analysts’ recommendations differ from the performance of unaflfiliated analysts’ 
recommendations. I begin this section with a short description of analysts’ recommendations 
and the performance of recommended stocks. Both market reactions to unaffiliated and 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations are discussed to get an idea about the investor's 
perceptions about the possible bias in affiliated analysts’ recommendations. Next, the origins 
of analyst conflicts of interest are described shortly to draw attention to the analysts’ likely 
incentives to bias their research. This section is concluded with a discussion about analyst 
compensation and the importance of analyst reputation in order to view the possible conflicts 
of interest inherent in analyst compensation structures.
2.2.1. Analyst recommendations and performance
This section summarises findings on the analysts’ recommendations and their effect on stock 
return performance. In addition, differences in market reactions to affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts’ recommendations are discussed.
Investors utilise a variety of information sources when making investment decisions. One 
relied source is the advice and recommendations contained in analysts’ reports. Morgan and 
Stocken (1998) find that, according to SRI International (1987), 66.2 percent of individual 
investors rate the analysts’ opinions “most important” when making investment decisions. In 
addition, 64 percent of professional investors regard their own firm analysts’ opinions 
valuable and 52 percent view other analyst opinions “most important” as well. Thus it can be 
said that analyst opinions and recommendations seem to make a difference.
According to several studies (see for example Womack (1996) and Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2006)) analysts are reluctant to issue “Sell” recommendations. In fact, “Sell” 
recommendations form only a few percents of the total amount of reported recommendations. 
Interestingly, Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) find that “Sell” recommendations are about four to
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five times as frequent in other G7 countries than in US. They conclude that analysts in US 
seem to face the largest conflicts of interest.
There are quite a few reasons for analyst optimism, one of which is that optimistic analysts 
have better career prospects than those who issue negative recommendations. Another 
explanation is that analysts experience larger costs in issuing “Sell” recommendations. These 
costs might result from the danger of losing investment banking clients after pessimistic 
recommendations, and there are several studies arguing that affiliated analysts issue more 
optimistic research than unaffiliated (see for example Agrawal and Chen (2007), Michaely 
and Womack (1999) and Lin and McNichols (1998)). Putting the investment banking 
relationship related reasons aside, issuing “Sell” recommendations presents more risk to 
analysts since “Sell” recommendations are less frequent and thus more visible.
According to Womack (1996), an incorrect judgement of a “Sell” recommendation is likely to 
be more costly for an analyst’s reputation than an incorrect “Buy” recommendation made 
when other analysts are more likely to make the same “Buy” recommendation. Thus the 
greater implicit costs of issuing a “Sell” recommendation might explain the larger magnitude 
of abnormal returns at and after “Sell” recommendations. Consistent with Womack (1996) 
discussion, Agrawal and Chen (2007) find that investors perceive an analyst to be more 
credible if he is willing to voice an unfavourable opinion on a stock despite of greater 
pressures to be optimistic. Analysts’ tendency to issue positive recommendations is a well 
known fact among sophisticated institutional investors who more often follow analysts’ 
recommendation changes in stead of exact recommendation levels.
The usefulness of analyst recommendations has been an interesting topic of debate among 
practitioners and academicians since the early beginning of analysts’ trade. In an efficient 
market, analyst stock picks should not perform better than a relevant market index, but 
empirical studies (see for example Womack 1996) have found a considerable effect on stocks 
recommended by analysts, indicative on the perceived value of these recommendations.
Existing literature finds that despite the inherent positive biases, analyst recommendations and 
recommendation revisions add value to investors. For example, Agrawal and Chen (2007) and 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) find that recommendation revisions have large effects on stock 
prices. For example, according to Agrawal and Chen (2007), when a stock is added to the
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strong buy list, it experiences a mean abnormal return of about 2 percent over two-day 
revision period. Womack (1996) finds similar results. He argues that three-day 
recommendation period returns are large and in the direction forecasted by the analysts. Both 
studies report also that downgrades have even larger effects. For example, Agrawal and Chen 
(2007) find that the two-day mean abnormal return around the drop from strong buy list is -4 
percent. In addition, according to Womack (1996), stock prices experience a considerable 
post-recommendation drift as well.
In addition, several studies (see for example Agrawal and Chen (2007), Lin and McNichols 
(1998) and Michaely and Womack (1999)) find dissimilarities between the market reactions 
to affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations. Clarke et al. (2004) find that while 
analysts at large investment banks provide more positive recommendations than analysts at 
other financial institutions, their recommendations are viewed more informative by the 
market. Abnormal returns following upgrades (downgrades) are significantly more positive 
(negative) for analysts at large investment banks. In addition, Bradley et al. (2007) find that 
the reactions in stock prices are more positive for affiliated than unaffiliated analysts. 
However, Bradley et al. (2007) conclude that the market has not effectively discounted for the 
bias in affiliated analysts’ recommendations in stead of viewing affiliated recommendations 
as more accurate.
On the other hand, when Bradley et al. (2007) expand the time window to (-10,+10) days, 
they find that unaffiliated analysts’ “Buy” recommendations outperform affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations by 2,4 percent. In addition, Michaely and Womack (1999) find that the 
market does not recognise the full extent of the bias in affiliated analysts’ recommendations 
and that affiliated analysts’ recommendations are, in the long-run, inferior to 
recommendations by non-underwriters. They also show that stocks that underwriter analysts 
recommend perform more poorly than “Buy” recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior 
to, at the time of and subsequent to the recommendation date.
Alternatively, there are studies suggesting that markets are able to discount for the possible 
bias entailed in affiliated analyst’s recommendations. Agrawal and Chen (2007) study both 
short-term trading volumes and market returns. They find that the short-term reactions of both 
stock prices and trading volumes to recommendation upgrades vary negatively with the 
magnitude of potential investment banking or brokerage conflicts faced by the analysts. For
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downgrades, conflict severity varies negatively with the short-term stock price reaction and 
positively with the short-term trading volume impact. These findings suggest that even though 
the level of analysts’ stock recommendations is positively related to the magnitude of 
conflicts of interest, the market recognises analyst conflicts and properly discounts analyst 
opinions. In addition, Michaely and Womack (1999) find that the size adjusted positive 
excess return for underwriter affiliated analysts’ “Buy” recommendations on IPO stocks at the 
recommendation date is smaller than for the “Buy” recommendations of unaffiliated analysts.
Some studies find differing reactions for affiliated analysts’ up- and downgrades. Barber et al. 
(2007), argue that investment bank “Hold” and “Sell” recommendations outperform those of 
independent research firms by 1.8 basis points per day on average whereas investment bank 
“Buy” recommendations underperform relative to the independent research firms’ “Buy” 
recommendations. In addition, Lin and McNichols (1998) find that announcement returns for 
lead underwriter “Hold” recommendations are significantly more negative than unaffiliated 
“Hold” recommendations but find no difference in the announcement period returns to lead 
and unaffiliated analysts “Strong buy” and “Buy” recommendations.
For longer time period returns, the results are mixed as well. For example, a study by Barber 
et al. (2001) suggests that following analysts’ recommendations would have been profitable. 
On the other hand, a study by the same group of researchers, done by a couple of years later, 
(Barber et al. (2003)) suggests that during a different time period (2000 and 2001), adhering 
to the analysts’ recommendations would have been “disastrous”. What is more, they show 
that the stocks least preferred by analysts outperformed the most favoured by 20%. In 
addition, Michaely and Womack (1999) find that long-run post-recommendation performance 
of underwriter analyst recommendations on IPO stocks is inferior to unaffiliated analysts’ 
recommendations.
Agrawal and Chen (2007) find no evidence that one-year investment performance of 
recommendation revisions is related to the magnitude of analyst conflicts, either with 
upgrades or downgrades. Bradley et al. (2007) have similar findings suggesting that following 
affiliated analysts’ research does not make investors significantly worse of than following 
unaffiliated analysts’ research. In addition, Lin and McNichols (1998) find no difference in 
the post-announcement performance of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts.
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2.2.2. Origins of analysts’ conflicts of interest
This section describes the possible origins for conflicts of interest related to analysts. Mehdan 
and Stulz (2006) argue that conflicts of interest between the corporate finance and research 
department stem from a situation where the investment bank gains from taking the analyst 
“over the wall”, i.e. taken on board, in a corporate finance situation. By taking a company 
analyst aboard in preparing an M&A deal, the corporate finance sector gains access to 
analyst’s information about the companies involved in the transaction. In turn, the analyst 
gains as she is able to gamer inside information about the customer firm involved in the 
transaction which would not be possible otherwise. This increased knowledge might be 
transmitted to the market via analyst’s recommendation, even though that should not happen. 
Thus crossing the wall might result in a better product for the consumers the investment 
bank’s analyst services. On the other hand, crossing the wall might increase analysts’ 
possibility to enhance her reputation by exploiting the information about the deal.
Several studies have found affiliated analysts’ recommendations biased at least to some extent 
and analysts to a subject of investment banking and brokerage pressure. For example, 
Ljungqvist et al. (2007) argue, that analysts issue more optimistic recommendations when 
they are affiliated with investment banks that have existing relationship with the firm covered 
and when they work for banks with larger brokerage businesses. Thus there might be conflicts 
of interest between the analysts and their employer when the bank aims to gain business, 
investment banking fees and competitiveness by pressuring analysts to issue 
recommendations that benefit bank’s corporate finance clients.
Some studies (see for example Ljungqvist et al. 2007 and Lim 2001) argue that analysts might 
bias their recommendations positively for their own advance, i.e. to stay in friendly terms 
with firm management. Insufficiently flattering research could result in a firm refusing to 
provide the analyst with timely information or access to senior management, undermining the 
analyst’s ability to be an effective informational intermediary. This kind of behaviour would 
lead to similar results as selection bias hypotheses, where advisors are hired due to 
appropriate analyst opinions. According to Mehdan and Stulz (2006), analyst conflicts of 
interest are most likely to realise when the benefits for the analyst of not preserving her 
reputation are high enough. The benefits of biased recommendations increase when the deal
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size increases since banking fees and analysts’ bonuses are related to the deal size. Hence 
analysts may bias their recommendations more if the deal value is high.
On the other hand, there are several studies arguing that the analyst behaviour seems to be 
guided by careers concerns. For example, Irvine (2004) finds that analysts that build 
reputations for providing reliable, accurate and timely research and recommendations 
generate additional trading business for their brokerage firms. In addition, according to 
Kothari (2001), these honest and accurate analysts receive higher compensation. Hong and 
Kubic (2003) argue that these analysts are more likely to be hired by the most prestigious 
investment banks as well.
To conclude, analysts face a trade-off between generating revenues for their employer’s 
brokerage and investment banking business and their private career concerns. While 
investment banking and brokerage pressure each could cause analysts to produce positively 
biased recommendations, biasing their research undermines their reputation with institutional 
clients who play a critical role in the formation of their reputation and ultimately, in the 
formation of their compensation.
2.2.3. Sell-side analysts’ reputation and compensation
Before the Global Research Analyst Settlements on April 28, 2003, a significant portion of 
analysts’ pay was based on their ability to generate revenues through service to investment 
banks’ corporate finance department. According to Michaely and Womack (1999) study, 
analysts who help attract underwriting business may receive a portion of the fees or, more 
likely, bonuses that are two to four times those of analysts without underwriting contributions. 
Another major factor affecting the analysts’ pay is perceived external reputation and 
according to Michaely and Womack (1999), being up-to-date and timely production of reports 
and estimates is of paramount importance with regard to analyst pay.
In addition, Groysberg et al. (2008) have studied analyst compensation by using more up to 
date data from a large financial institution and interviews on analyst compensation with 
research directors at several investment banks. They find that the analyst compensation is
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positively related to five variables: ranking among the top analysts in an industry by 
Institutional Investor II ratings2, covering a stock that generates investment banking business 
for the firm, being hired from a competitor rather than being home-grown, covering stocks 
with large trading volume and strong financial sector stock performance. Groysberg et al. 
(2008) find no evidence that earnings forecast accuracy or stock recommendation 
performance is related to compensation.
Groysberg et al. (2008) findings, that the economic magnitude of Institutional Investor II 
ratings on analyst’s compensation is significant, are particularly interesting in the context of 
conflicts of interest. According to Groysberg et al. (2008), top rated analysts received 65 
percent higher compensation than unrated peers. Analysts following investment banking 
client received 9-10 percent higher total compensation than analysts with no banking clients. 
In addition, an increase of 10 percent in trading volume of stocks covered resulted in a 1.8 
percent change in total compensation. Additionally, one extra year of experience increases 
analyst compensation by 7-9 percent. Home-grown analysts in turn earn 13 percent less than 
analysts’ hired form competing firms.
These findings suggest that analyst reputation is the most important factor in analyst 
compensation and thus a powerful counterforce in the conflicts of interest and biased 
recommendations issue. However, according to Groysberg et al. (2008), II ranking is viewed 
as a “winner-take-all” contest among analysts in a given industry. Only the analysts ranked 
among the top in their industry receive any compensation differential. The motivation of un­
ranked and below top- ranked analysts is an interesting question that might leave some room 
to conflicts of interest resulting in biased research. In addition, due to the nature of 
Institutional Investor II rankings (see footnote 2), they are not clean from the effects of 
analysts’ contributions to investment banking business and client firm relationships.
2 II ratings, which have been available since 1972, are based on an annual survey of customers at the largest US 
institutions. The survey requests customers to vote for analysts who ”have been the most helpful to you and your 
institution in researching US equities within last 12 months” and thus the rankings are a measure of analysts’ 
overall effectiveness. Each analyst is ranked within an industry and the ranks are published in Institutional 
Investor magazine for roughly 80 industries. Since 1995, also more comprehensive data on rankings is sold to 
Wall Street research directors.
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2.3. Investment banking relationship, conflicts of interest and regulation
In the framework of affiliated analysts, conflict of interest and investment banking, the 
previous literature is divided mainly into three different lines. One of these lines is the 
securities underwriting relationship and conflicts of interest rising from the situation where 
analysts aim to aid their employer in either gaining underwriting business or pleasing current 
bank clients. Another line of literature concentrates on comparing the recommendations 
published by investment bank and brokerage house employed analysts to recommendations 
published by analysts working in independent research houses. These studies do not 
necessarily specify any specific context or situation for the conflicts of interest but assume 
them to rise merely from analyst relation to different employers (e.g. Barber et al. 2007) or 
use quantitative measures of the magnify the potential conflicts of interest. For example, the 
importance of investment banking business to the bank may be measured by calculating the 
relative size of revenues generated from that line of business. The third, and according to 
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) and Bradley et al. (2007), so far least studied, line is conflicts 
of interest in M&A context. Employer’s brokerage business may also put an analyst under 
pressure to issue biased research. However, I do not discuss this line of conflicts of interest in 
my thesis.
A number of studies (e.g. Michaely and Womack (1999), Lin and McNichols (1998) and 
Dugar and Nathan (1995)) have focused on conflicts faced by analysts in context of existing 
underwriter relationship. Michaely and Womack (1999) results suggest that underwriter 
analysts’ recommendations are positively biased and that the same investment banks' analysts 
make better recommendations when their employer is not acting as a lead underwriter. Thus 
Michaely and Womack (1999) argue that it is the bias related to the position of lead 
underwriter that drives their results, not the differing abilities of analysts. Lin and McNichols 
(1998) find that lead and co-underwriter analyst’s growth forecasts and particularly their 
recommendations are more favourable than those made by unaffiliated analysts although their 
near-term earnings forecasts are generally not. However, their findings suggest that affiliated 
analysts strategically avoid “Sell” recommendations to maintain client relations.
My thesis concentrates on conflicts of interest in M&A situations and thus I discuss the 
literature concerning conflicts of interest in M&A context more thoroughly in section 2.3.2 .
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My main references are Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) working paper that concentrate on 
finding evidence on conflicts of interest in both target and acquirer advisor affiliated analysts’ 
recommendation changes in stock and cash deals, and an article by Bradley et al. (2007) that 
studies tender offers.
2.3.1. Investment bank role and fee-contracts in M&A context
One of the investment banks’ most central tasks in M&A context is to alleviate information 
asymmetry between the firms participating in the deal. According to Kale et al. (2003) and 
McLaughlin (1990), financial advisors perform two distinct roles in takeovers. First, they help 
in identifying and/or structuring better mergers, i.e. mergers with higher synergistic gains. In 
this role, investment banks identify potential targets or bidders, evaluate stand-alone and 
combined values and propose methods for obtaining synergies. All of these activities produce 
information that makes hidden value more transparent and thus alleviates information 
asymmetries and reduces transaction costs. Second, financial advisors provide client firms 
with advice in strategic activities. These strategic activities include designing offers to ensure 
takeover success (bidder’s advisor) and tactics aiming to increase takeover premium (target’s 
advisor).
However, according to McLaughlin (1990), the investment bank’s role is controversial in 
M&A situations due to the potential conflicts of interest that may arise between the bankers 
and their client firms. McLaughlin (1990) argues that investment banking contracts may 
include fee structures that create potential for conflicts of interest between bankers and client 
firms, particularly in offer evaluation, hostile offers and the deal price formation.
Investment banking fee contracts are complex and unique to each transaction, but according 
to McLaughlin (1990), some common features can be identified. Contract fees fall into three 
basic categories: fixed fees, shares-based fees and value-based fees. Fixed fees are 
independent on offer outcome and are used infrequently. Shares- and value-based fees, in 
contrast, are contingent on offer outcome. Shares-based fees are contingent only on the 
number of shares purchased and are usual in bidding-firm contracts. They are often step- 
functions of the number of shares purchased. Usually the first fee increase occurs at or above 
the percentage at which the bidding firm acquires voting control of the target. Value-based 
fees are contingent on both the number of shares acquired and the price paid, and are typically
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used by target firms according to McLaughlin (1990). Value-based fees are paid only for a 
completed deal. Total-value fees are usually linear functions of deal value. In incremental- 
value-fee contract, an additional fee is paid only if an offer above a specified amount results 
in a transaction. The main findings of McLaughlin (1990) study are presented in table 2.
TABLE 2.1. Summary of major findings in McLaughlin (1990)
Target firms Acquirer firms
Contract 80 % of fee contingent 80% of fee contingent
Form on transaction value on completion the transaction or 
on number of shares purchased




Incentive to complete No incentive to minimise




Interestingly, McLaughlin (1990) finds that contract incentives in hostile offers are not 
usually focused on maintaining the target’s independence. Even if the success of the original 
hostile bid results in payment of the smallest fee, investment bank’s fees are often maximised 
if some transaction is completed. As discussed also in McLaughlin (1990), this might be 
caused by target management avoidance of creating conflicts of interest with shareholder 
value maximisation.
In addition to the findings presented above, McLaughlin (1990) finds also that fees increase 
with the value of the deal offer, although the increase is not proportional. This relation to the 
deal size may make the investment bank task related to offer valuation compromised, since 
higher deal value results in higher fees. In addition, fees vary widely for offers of comparable 
value and are substantially higher for completed transaction, which applies usually for the 
target-firms' fee contracts as well. These findings in McLaughlin (1990) suggest in my 
opinion that the fee contracts create incentives for investment banks to aim for completed 
transactions that have as high deal value as possible.
As can be seen from the findings in McLaughlin (1990), the investment banking contracts 
entail possible conflicts of interest. Firstly, bidding-firm contracts provide no incentives for 
the investment bank to minimise the price paid since fees are mostly contingent on deal
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completion and value. In addition, a higher offer increases the probability of deal closure. 
Secondly, target-firm contracts in hostile offers frequently contain incentives for the target 
firm’s banker to complete a hostile transaction.
However, according to McLaughlin (1992) and Kale et al. (2003), investment banks have 
strong incentives to obtain a high reputation because they need to sell their services repeatedly 
in the markets. McLaughlin (1992) argues that reputation building concerns mitigate the 
incentives for conflicts of interest inherent in fee contracts. On the other hand, investment 
banks may use positively biased analyst research as a means of both pleasing clients and 
acquiring more M&A business. Even though this strategic use of biased analyst 
recommendations alleviates conflicts of interest between the bank and its client, they are not 
erased completely. In stead, they are transferred to the relationship between the client firm 
and investors.
Finally, according to Bodnaruk et al. (2007), advisor banks have access to insider information 
about the target’s characteristics, the bidder’s intentions and the terms of the deal. This 
information can be directly exploited in the market since there is no regulation preventing 
advisor banks from having stakes in target companies. Having a stake in the target creates an 
incentive to maximise the deal price and the probability of deal completion. This is not in the 
best interest of acquirer firm and thus having a stake in a target may induce the bank to 
sacrifice the interest of acquirer-client. In addition, maximised deal price maximises bank’s 
fees as well as described earlier in this section.
Bodnaruk et al. (2007) show, that the presence of bidder-advisor owners makes it 45 
percentage points more likely that a firm will become a takeover target. Also the probability 
of deal success is heightened when there is a bidder-advisor owner presence. Their findings 
show also that a trading strategy conditional on the advisor’s stake delivers a net-of-risk 
performance of 4.08 percent per month. This cannot be replicated by using publicly available 
information.
Bodnaruk et al. (2007) findings suggest that the advisory bank greatly benefits from the 
capital gains accruing from the deal. Bodnaruk et al. (2007) find also that advisory-induced 
deals do not appear to be good fit for the acquirers. Indeed, when compared to firms where 
acquirer-advisor has no stake in, the acquirer-advisor owned firms tend to be overvalued for
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over 10 percents. In addition, these deals have also lower post-merger profitability, and the 
acquirers taking part are usually less experienced than the average bidder in the M&A market.
Bodnaruk et al. (2007) conclude that advisors do take advantage of their privileged position, 
not only by acquiring stakes in the deals on which they advise but also by directly affecting 
the outcome of the deal, increasing its probability of success. These findings show that the 
conflicts of interests can rise from issues purely related with the bank's self-interests as well.
2.3.2. Conflicts of interest in M&A context
I start this section by distinguishing different settings of conflicts of interest inherent in M&A 
situations. I then continue by discussing the studies of Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) and 
Bradley et al (2007) which are my main references.
Economic theory has presented several motives for M&A deals and each of these motives 
entails a different setting of conflicts of interest. Efficiency related reasons for M&A often 
relate to creating synergies via, for example, economies of scale. Growth related motives 
include attempts to create market power or diversify through M&A activities. Growth and 
efficiency related motives usually result in joint interest of both investment bank and the 
acquirer and target shareholders to close the deal. However, the situation might not be in the 
best interest of target management, which creates conflict of interest between them and their 
shareholders. Acquirer management’s desire to grow their business leads to M&A deals as 
well. If this desire stems from a fixation to over-expand the business, the deals done are not in 
the best interest of acquirer shareholders.
The M&A market is also called as the “market for corporate control” which refers to a 
situation where other companies in the market notice a company’s management is 
incompetent and thus aim to replace it by buying the company. Obviously, this commonly 
leads to hostile acquisition situations, where it is in the interest of the acquirer management 
and its advisors to close the deal whereas the target management wants the opposite. These 
situations create possible conflict of interest between the target management and the advising 
bank. In addition, target-management’s interests conflicts also with target’s shareholders. 
According to Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), mergers appear in waves and cluster within 
industries. In addition, according to Andrade et al. (2001), industries tend to restructure and
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consolidate in concentrated periods of time and these restructurings occur suddenly and are 
hard to predict. Based on these findings, Andrade et al. (2001) argue that mergers might occur 
as a reaction to a certain shock in an industry. They find that deregulation is the most potential 
industry shock to explain for increased merger activity.
The fact that merger activity is clustered within time and industries might generate a conflict 
of interest between the advisor banks and investing public. By knowing that mergers might 
cluster and appear in waves, the banks realise that at certain times there are more M&A 
business and - revenues to be gained than in the normal market situation. This might 
encourage investment banks to attempt to obtain as many deals as possible during these times 
of increased merger activity, which would result in increased competition. One result of the 
increased competition might be that the investment banks’ incentives to close M&A deals 
would include improving their reputation and status in the eyes of potential new clients. This 
might result in giving biased recommendations for clients’ stock to make the deals appear 
better than they truly are.
In addition to the different motives, also different forms of payment generate conflicts of 
interest in an M&A situation, as discussed by Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) as well. The 
acquirer may use both its own stock and cash as a form of payment and a mixture of the two 
can be used as well. The medium of payment creates different settings for conflicts of interest 
between the deal related shareholders and the other investment society, since the stock of the 
acquiring firm becomes a medium of payment to the deal related shareholders and their 
companies.
In a stock deal, it is in the interest of the acquirer and its shareholders to get as high as 
possible share price prior to the setting of the exchange ratio. This would minimise the 
amount of shares paid to the target’s shareholders. Obviously, the target’s shareholders have 
the opposite goal; they wish the acquirer’s share to be in its lows at the time the ratio is 
decided to get as high exchange ratio as possible. In a cash deal the stock price plays a smaller 
role since the stock is not used as a medium of payment.
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) obtain M&A transaction data for years 1993 to 2001 and their 
data consists of statutory mergers and acquisitions of assets. Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) 
divide their hypotheses according to analyst affiliation, report timing and the form of
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payment. They argue that acquirer-affiliated analysts are overly positive about acquirer, and 
that target-affiliated analysts are overly positive about the target, in all time windows 
surrounding the M&A announcement. In addition, acquirer-affiliated analysts are assumed to 
be pessimistic about the target in all time windows. However, Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) 
argue that target-affiliated analysts may change their views about the acquirer during the 
acquisition process in stock financed deals. Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) hypotheses are 
summarized in table 2.2 next page.
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Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) study both the recommendation revisions around M&A deals 
and analysts’ growth forecasts. They find evidence for conflicts of interest on 
recommendation revisions for acquirer-affiliated analysts covering acquirers. In their ordered 
logistic regression analysis, Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) find evidence that acquirer- 
affiliated analysts are more optimistic about acquirers than the consensus. In addition, they 
find evidence suggesting that the deal value magnifies the effects of analyst affiliation. 
However, their findings for acquirer-affiliated analysts reporting on targets are mixed and 
they can not conclude that acquirer-affiliation would affect upgrades of target stock. 
However, they do find evidence that when stock deals are large, target-affiliated analysts 
become more optimistic about the acquirer after the setting of the exchange ratio which is 
consistent with their conflict of interest hypotheses.
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) study also the effect of target and acquirer affiliation on long­
term growth forecasts. They find statistically significant results only for acquirer-affiliated 
analysts’ long-term growth forecasts on acquirers and conclude that acquirer-affiliated analyst 
tend to issue slightly more positive long-term growth forecasts than consensus. However, this 
result is economically insignificant. Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) conclude that there seems 
to be conflicts of interest present in analysts’ recommendations and recommendation changes 
but not in long-term growth forecasts. Table 2.3 presents the findings of Kolasinski and 
Kothari (2007).
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under conflicts of interest
Findings
Acquirer Acquirer Cash Anytime Optimism Supporting evidence 
provided
Target Acquirer Cash Anytime Indeterminate/
Pessimism
No supporting evidence
Acquirer Acquirer Stock Before 
Exchange 
ratio set
Optimism Supporting evidence 
provided
Acquirer Acquirer Stock After 
Exchange 
ratio set
Optimism Supporting evidence 
provided
Target Acquirer Stock Before 
Exchange 
ratio set
Pessimism Supporting evidence 
provided for large deals
Target Acquirer Stock After 
Exchange 
ratio set
Optimism Supporting evidence 
provided for large deal
Target Target Anytime Optimism Mixed,
no evidence provided
Acquirer Target Anytime Pessimism Mixed,
no evidence provided
Bradley et al. (2007) study whether there is systematic evidence of conflicts of interest in 
analyst behaviour surrounding tender offers. They compare the ratings strength of affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations in stead of studying the recommendation changes 
studied by Kolasinski and Kothari (2007). Contrary to Kolasinski and Kothari (2007), they 
exclude all stock financed deals and address the question of whether analyst opinions are 
useful relating to tender offer transactions. In addition, Bradley et al. (2007) study the stock 
market reaction to affiliated and unaffiliated recommendations which is not studied in 
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007). After excluding the stock financed deals Bradley et al. (2007) 
are forced to study only hypotheses relating to whether analysts issue biased research to 
attract investment banking and M&A business and leave out the deal execution-related 
hypotheses of analysts acting strategically to either increase the probability of deal closing or 
optimising the deal value, which were included in the Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) study.
Bradley et al. (2007) also concentrate on recommendations and leave out long-term growth 
estimates studied in Kolasinski and Kothari paper (2007). Bradley at al. (2007) study also 
whether analysts add value by identifying possible targets prior the announcement. They 
argue that if analysts were able to identify future targets, they would issue more buy 
recommendations on targets before the M&A announcement or time up- and downgrades to 
create investor value.
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Bradley et al. (2007) do not separate affiliated analysts by target or acquirer affiliation as 
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) and assume that affiliated analysts in general issue overly 
optimistic recommendations about client firms involved in M&A deals. They then argue that 
analysts might issue these overly positive recommendations due to two reasons, the first being 
that they simply are biasing their research to benefit client firms and the bank, and the second 
being that affiliated analysts came into possession of superior insider information which is 
then passed on to their recommendations. Thus Bradley et al. (2007) assume conflicts of 
interest to benefit either client firms and investment banks or analysts themselves. Bradley et 
al. (2007) hypotheses are presented in table 2.4 below.
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Bradley et al. (2007) do not find evidence of systematic conflicts of interest in their whole 
sample. However, sub-period analysis for the years 1999-2000 suggests that conflicts of 
interest may have existed during the internet bubble period. They are also unable to find 
evidence that analysts can discern successful acquisitions from the unsuccessful ones in their 
analysis of long-term returns. Instead, they find that stocks rated below “Buy” outperform 
those with “Buy” recommendations and conclude that although investors that follow affiliated 
analysts’ recommendations are not significantly worse off than investors that follow
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unaffiliated analysts, neither group does better than investors who do not use analysts’ 
recommendations at all. Table 2.5 below presents the findings of Bradley et al. (2007)
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optimistic 
recommendations 
compared to affiliated 




cash After less optimistic no
discount
outperform Support for less 
optimistic 
recommendations 
compared to affiliated 
analysts for the period of 
1999-2000.
As can be seen from the studies by Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) and Bradley et al. (2007), 
there are analyst affiliation seems to generate conflicts of interest even though the results 
presented in the studies are mixed. The reason why Bradley et al. (2007) failed to find 
evidence on conflicts of interest may be due to the fact that they did not divide analyst 
affiliation according to the advisor relationship as Kolasinski and Kothari did in their study.
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2.3.3. Selection bias in M&A context
Even though selection bias is much more eminent in investment banking relationships in 
security issuance situations, according to Kolasinski and Kothari (2007), there are 
circumstances where selection bias is present in M&A context as well. The acquirer advisor’s 
goal is to obtain as low valuation of the target as possible, so it is plausible that its execution 
ability would be compromised if it employs an analyst who is bullish on the target. Thus 
investment banking firms with bullish priors about the target might be less likely to get 
assigned as acquirer advisors. For similar reasons, the target advisor’s execution ability would 
be compromised if it employs analysts bearish about the target. Hence Kolasinski and Kothari 
(2007) argue, that the selection bias hypothesis predicts that target-affiliated analysts are 
optimistic about the target and acquirer-affiliated analysts are pessimistic about the target.
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) discuss in addition that in a stock deals, acquirer’s advisors 
seek a high valuation of the acquirer’s stock and thus selection bias hypothesis predicts that 
acquirer-affiliated analysts are optimistic about the acquirer. In contrast, target advisors seek a 
low valuation of acquirer stock (before the exchange ratio is set, that is) and thus selection 
bias hypothesis suggests that target-affiliated analysts are pessimistic about the acquirer.
However, Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) recognise two situations that are free from selection 
bias in M&A context. The first is a situation where acquirer-affiliated analysts are reporting 
on the acquirer in cash deals. In a cash deal the acquirer stock price is irrelevant and therefore 
optimism or pessimism compared to the consensus recommendations may be viewed as a 
manifestation of conflicts of interest. Optimism would aid client management to sell the deal 
to shareholders and would also suit for their general desire for optimism.
The second situation considers target-affiliated analysts in stock deals and the possible 
manifestation of conflicts of interest is seen in the reaction of target-affiliated analysts after 
the setting of the stock exchange ratio. To aid clients, target-affiliated analysts could be 
pressured to publish pessimistic research before the setting of the exchange ratio. This could 
be a result of either honestly pessimistic view regarding the acquirer stock or selection bias. 
However, the change of analyst opinion from pessimistic to optimistic after the setting of the 
exchange ratio would suggest that there are conflicts of interest at play.
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2.3.4. Recent regulatory changes and their possible impact
The stock market crash of 2000-2001 triggered concerns that investors were misled by 
analysts’ and their biased research (see for example Hadan et al. 2008). Concerns resulted in 
changes in regulatory environment beginning in July 2002. The main changes in US were 
NASD Rule 2711 and the amended NYSE Rule 472 on sell-side research. Finally, in 
December 2002, the Global Analyst Research Settlement involving ten US banks (later 
twelve), the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD and the New York Attorney General was formally 
announced. The purpose of these regulations was to restrain conflicts of interest that affected 
analysts’ research by substantially limiting relations between research and investment banking 
departments. The new rules also set up rigorous disclosure requirements3 that intended to 
make research output more meaningful.
The stock market crash of 2000 resulted in regulatory changes in Europe as well. Commission 
of the European Community (CEC) summoned a working-group of private sector activators, 
independent consultants, regulators and professional groups to examine the matter. In 
addition, new directives were enacted and the technical committee of International 
Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) published a report considering analyst 
conflicts of interest. CEC working group report concentrated on commenting on conflicts of 
interests resulting from analyst’s participation in investment banking activities, best practices 
followed in companies issuing securities, analyst’s compensation and analysts’ securities 
trading. IOSCO’s report mentions, among other things, the importance of investor education 
in the elimination of analysts’ conflicts of interest.
Directives focus on instructions on organising operations to ensure the neutrality of analysts' 
research and defining disclosure requirements on, for example, the identity of the analyst and 
his employer, assumptions behind the recommendations and definition of the meaning of 
recommendation classes. In addition, similar disclosure requirements mentioned in footnote 3 
are defined in the directives. As a whole, CEC assumes that the conflicts of interests can be 
dealt with both self-regulation and best-practices principles concerning controlling and
3 Disclosure requirements include for example information on whether an analyst receives compensation based 
on investment banking revenue, whether she holds a position in the company or whether the subject company is 
a client.
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disclosure of conflicts of interests between analysts, issuers and investment banks. In 
addition, investor education about the possible conflicts of interests is seen as an important 
means of restraining the conflicts of interests.
Kadan et al. (2008) have studied the effects of regulation change on affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations. According to Kadan et al.(2008), regulation changes induced a new rating 
scale of only three classes in US, “Buy”, “Hold”/”Neutral” and “Sell” which was adopted by 
a large number of analysts from year 2002 onwards. However, Kadan et al. (2008) argue that 
the scale change is somewhat cosmetic since prior the change, most of the analysts were 
reporting merely “Strong buy”, “Buy” and “Hold” recommendations and thus using a de-facto 
three-point scale. Still, the change in rating system would have made a difference for retail 
investors who may have failed to make the adjustment of “Strong buy” to “Buy”, “Buy” to 
“Hold” and “Hold” to “Sell” as institutional investors probably managed to do.
Kadan et al. (2008) argue that the regulation changes and the migration to three-tier rating 
system have affected the informative value of recommendations. Additionally, affiliated 
analysts are no longer more likely to issue optimistic recommendations compared to 
unaffiliated analysts. However, they are still less likely to issue pessimistic recommendations. 
Kadan et al. (2008) find also that price reactions to optimistic recommendations have become 
stronger after the regulations whereas reactions to neutral and pessimistic recommendations 
have become less negative. This might be due to the fact that the relative amount of negative 
recommendations has increased in their sample after the regulation change and thus a negative 
recommendation does not contain as much information as it did before the regulations. There 
are no studies concerning the effects of the new European regulation on conflicts of interest in 
analyst recommendations on European stocks.
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3. Hypotheses
My hypotheses are described in this section. I have hypotheses relating to three categories of 
variables. First category, analyst report characteristics, includes variables describing the 
source of affiliation and report timing related to the M&A deal announcement. The second 
category, deal specific variables, includes variables that measure the effects of the transaction 
characteristics on conflicts of interest (form of payment, deal value, attitude). The third 
category, deal timing, includes variables regarding the market situation during the deal 
announcement (bear/bull market, high / low M&A volume period, before / after European 
regulation changes 2003).
Foundation for my hypotheses is formed on the main motives behind the conflicts of interest 
in an M&A advisor-client relationship. Based on the literature review in section 2, conflicts of 
interest may be formed between the investment bank and its client firm (both acquirer- and 
target-clients), and, when the interests of client-firm and the bank are congruent, between 
them and investors. In addition, matching bank -client-firm interests may conflict with bank- 
employed analyst’s interests, if the analyst aims to maximise personal reputation by 
exploiting insider information. Table 3.1 presents the motives in the most simplified level. 
These motives become more complex when they are considered in more detail in varying 
investment banking relationships and different deal contexts.
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Analysts aim to exploit insider information 
in issuing more accurate recommendations
H5, H9
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Analyst rev or t characteristics
Affiliation
According to McLaughlin (1990), investment banking fees are conditional on both deal value 
and completion. Thus both target-and acquirer-affiliated analysts may be assumed to aim for 
the maximisation of deal price and completion probability. Completion probability can be 
increased by issuing more high level recommendations or upgrading acquirer’s stock after the 
deal announcement since this might increase shareholder approval for the deal as discussed in 
section 2.1.1. My first hypothesis is the following:
HI Affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer-client’s stock after the deal has been announced
Higher recommendations would also please the acquirer-client’s management’s general desire 
for positive recommendations which would enable investment banks to use positive 
recommendations as a competitive tool when they try to win investment banking business as 
discussed by Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) and presented in the literature part. On the other 
hand, the optimism of acquirer’s stock may also result from selection bias as discussed in 
section 2.3.4. My second and third hypotheses are the following:
H2 Acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more high level (“Strong buy” and “Buy”)
recommendations about acquirer’s stock than other analysts
H3 Acquirer-affiliated analysts issue less negative (“Sell” and “Strong sell”)
recommendations than other analysts
In addition, according to selection bias hypothesis presented by Kolasinski and Kothari 
(2007), target companies would benefit from pessimistic recommendations about the acquirer 
since this would affect the stock exchange ratio. Thus target companies might be interested in 
hiring an advisor bank whose analysts have pessimistic priors about the acquirer. My fourth 
hypothesis is the following:
H4 Target-affiliated analysts are pessimistic about the acquirer and issue lower level 
recommendations about acquirer’s stock
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Reputation
Good reputation is a dear possession for both analyst and the bank. Investment banks have 
strong incentives to obtain high reputation because they need to sell their services repeatedly 
in the markets and McLaughlin (1990) argues that the reputation building concerns mitigate 
the incentives for conflicts of interest in investment banks’ fee contracts. In addition, as 
discussed in section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, analysts’ reputation as a provider of honest and accurate 
research has a significant effect on analysts pay. Thus highly reputable analysts are less 
probable to issue overly optimistic research. Most reputable analysts are often hired by the 
best and largest investment banks and thus my fifth hypothesis is the following:
H5 Analysts hired by the top 15 largest banks issue less optimistic research
Timing
Analysts’ report timing is related to the different form of payment situations, i.e. is the report 
published before or after a stock exchange ratio has been set, and the hypotheses affected by 
the timing variable are discussed in the next section.
Deal specific variables
Form of payment
As a whole, it is in banks’ best interest to maximise M&A deal value and completion 
probability. This is backed up by several issues discussed in literature review in chapter 2. For 
example, as discussed in section 2.3.1 (McLaughlin (1990)), bank’s fees are closely related to 
deal closure and deal value. In addition, analyst pay is related to recommending investment 
banking client’s stock and the analysts that recommend investment banking client’s stock are 
rewarded with bonuses conditional on the deal value (Groysberg (2008)). Also acquirer- 
advisor bank’s stake in target company makes it advantageous for the bank to maximise the 
deal value (Bodnaruk (2007)).
Deal value maximisation for target client can be achieved for example by advantageously 
affecting the acquirer’s stock price surrounding the setting of stock exchange ratio in stock 
financed deals. For example, target-affiliated analysts could try to maximise deal value for 
their client firms by issuing lower recommendations prior the deal announcement and higher 
recommendations after the deal announcement. This would result in a higher stock exchange
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ratio. On the other hand, acquirer-affiliated analysts could try to minimise the deal cost to 
their client firm by issuing higher recommendations about the acquirer’s stock prior the deal 
announcement to increase the value of the medium of payment before the stock exchange 
ratio has been decided and thus minimise the amount of stock needed to give up to the target. 
I name the hypotheses related to affiliated analysts’ strategic recommendation behaviour as 
strategic behaviour hypotheses and they are the following:
H6 In stock-deals, target-affiliated analysts issue lower recommendations or downgrade 
acquirer’s stock before the deal has been announced and the exchange ratio set
H7 In stock-deals, target-affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations or upgrade 
acquirer’s stock after the deal has been announced and the exchange ratio set
H8 In stock deals, acquirer-affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations or upgrade 
the acquirer’s stock before the exchange ratio has been decided
However, stock-financed deal announcements usually result in deterioration of the acquirer’s 
stock value, as discussed in section 2.1.1. concerning the short-term returns related to M&A 
deal announcements. Thus under the assumption that analysts aim to enhance their own 
reputation by utilising the insider information they gamer when they are taken “over the wall’’ 
as discussed in section 2.2.2, affiliated analysts should issue lower recommendations or 
downgrade acquirer’s stock before the deal announcement. Thus my ninth hypothesis is the 
following:




Analysts are keen to maintain an excellent reputation (Groysberg (2008)) and, as discussed in 
section 2.2.2 concerning the origins of analysts’ conflicts of interest, may need large enough 
gains from biasing their research due to the damage biased recommendations might cause to 
their reputation. Gains grow larger when the deal value increases since analysts’ bonuses may 
be tied to M&A deal fees. Thus my tenth hypothesis is the following:
H10 Bias in affiliated analysts’ recommendations is larger when deal value is large
Attitude
As discussed in section 2.3.1, according to McLaughlin (1990), investment bank fees are 
closely tied to deal completion. This holds also for a target-advisor in hostile deals and target- 
affiliated analysts may want to maximise deal completion probability and upgrade acquirer 
stock to increase acquirer and target shareholder approval for the deal. Thus my 11th 
hypothesis is the following:
Hl 1 Target-affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer stock after a hostile deal is announced 
Deal timing
As discussed in section 2.3.2 concerning conflicts of interest in M&A context, mergers seem 
to be clustered within time. This might increase investment bank competition in times of high 
merger activity which in turn would realise in overly optimistic analysts’ recommendations 
published to win investment banking business. In addition, upgrading acquirer’s stock would 
make the deal appear better and thus improve investment bank’s reputation and aid in gaining 
more business. Thus my 12th hypothesis is the following:
H12 Investment bank employed analysts issue more high recommendations during high 
M&A volume years (2000 and 2004-2006 in my sample)
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In addition, according to Bradley et al. (2007), affiliated analysts issue overly optimistic 
recommendations during the stock bubble of 2000. Thus my 13th hypothesis is the following:
H13 Affiliated analysts issue overly optimistic recommendations during stock market 
upturns (1996-2000 and 2003-2006 in my sample)
Regulation changes of the year 2003 in Europe made the analyst affiliation easier to perceive 
due to, for example, increased disclosure requirements and investor education as discussed in 
the section 2.3.4. This could result in less optimistic recommendations and an increase in 
negative recommendations issued by affiliated analysts if the regulation change would have 
had similar effects is Europe as in US (Kadan et al. 2008)). Thus my 14th hypothesis is the 
following:
H14 Affiliated analysts issue more negative (“Sell” and “Strong sell”) recommendations 
after year 2003
Table 3.2 next page presents my hypotheses.
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TABLE 3.2. The hypotheses used in my thesis.
Hypotheses
HI Affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer-client’s stock after the deal has been announced
H2 Acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more high level (“Strong buy” and “Buy”) recommendations about 
acquirer’s stock than other analysts
H3 Acquirer-affiliated analysts issue less negative (“Sell" and “Strong sell”) recommendations than other 
analysts
H4 Target-affiliated analysts are pessimistic about the acquirer and issue lower level recommendations 
about acquirer’s stock
H5 Analysts hired by the top 15 largest banks issue less optimistic research
H6 In stock-deals, target-affiliated analysts issue lower recommendations or downgrade acquirer’s stock 
before the deal has been announced and the exchange ratio set
H7 In stock-deals, target-affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations or upgrade acquirer’s stock after 
the deal has been announced and the exchange ratio set
H8 In stock deals, acquirer-affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations or upgrade the acquirer’s stock 
before the exchange ratio has been decided
H9 Affiliated analysts downgrade acquirer’s stock before the announcement of a stock financed deal
H10 Bias in affiliated analysts’ recommendations is larger when deal value is large
Hll Target-affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer stock after a hostile deal is announced
H12 Investment bank employed analysts issue more high recommendations during high M&A volume years 
(2000 and 2004-2006 in my sample)
H13 Affiliated analysts issue overly optimistic recommendations during stock market upturns (1996-2000 
and 2003-2006 in my sample)
H14 Affiliated analysts issue more negative (“Sell" and “Strong sell”) recommendations after year 2003
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4. Data and methodology
4.1. Sample selection and description
4.1.1. Mergers and acquisitions
My sample size is 814 mergers and acquisitions. Data for M&As is gathered from SDC 
Platinum database. The data is for time period 1996-2006 and consists of publicly quoted 
companies; both target and acquirer are publicly quoted. The data time period ends in 2006 
with the intention that I will be able to get analyst recommendations for a whole year after all 
deals. I start the data from 1996 to get both down- and upturns in the dataset. Both acquirer 
and target companies are European companies. The sample has not been limited into any 
specific industries. Minimum deal size is lm EUR.
The sample consists of M&A deals where the acquirer gains full ownership of the target. 
Nearly all M&A situations have a friendly status. The fact that there must be analyst 
recommendations available both prior and after the deal announcement reduces the size of the 
final sample. Table 4.1 describes the derivation process of the sample.
TABLE 4.1 Data Derivation Process for sample mergers and acquisitions
Selection Criteria Number of mergers and acquisitions 
meeting selection criteria
Mergers in SDC Platinum Database between years 1996-2006, 
European acquirers and European targets
6 979
Acquisitions described in SDC as merger, tender offer or acquisition of 
assets. Excludes acquisitions described by SDC as acquisition of certain 
assets, acquisition of partial interest, acquisition of remaining interest, 
buy-backs, recapitalisations, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, self-tenders, 
repurchases, minority share purchases or privatisations
2 980
Acquisitions, for which the deal value larger than 1,0 m EUR 911
Acquirer ownership after transaction 100% 875




Figure 1 presents the final sample M&A deal volume by year. Years 2000 and 2004-2006 are 
high volume years in my sample. Also the number of deals per year in my final sample is 
presented.
FIGURE 1. M&A deal volume and number of deals in final data sample divided by year.
200 -i
Total 19 39 49 63 105 60 59 61 77 130 152
Figure 2 below presents the S&P 350 index values for my sample period. Years 1996-2000 
and 2004-2006 are bull markets in my sample period.











I am going to study analyst recommendation levels (i.e. strong buy, buy, hold, sell, strong sell 
comments) and changes in them. While many early studies on of potential analyst conflicts 
examine optimism in earnings forecasts, I concentrate on the recommendations since 
Ljungqvist et al. (2007) argue that analysts’ recommendations give a good proxy for the value 
and bias in the analyst’s report. In addition, Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and Womack (1996) 
discuss that the recommendations and timely release of recommendation changes contain 
aspects of analyst’s integrity, responsiveness, industry knowledge and professionalism which 
are among the most valued analyst characteristics by investors.
Moreover, according to Kolasinski and Kothari (2007), exact forecasts of EPS and other 
figures tend to be targeted for institutional investors, who have more knowledge and research 
power to detect whether they are reliable or not. Thus it is clear that bias in these figures 
would be easily spotted by the main recipients of analysts’ research and this encourages 
analysts to keep their forecasts unbiased. Also Ljungqvist et al. (2007) argue that there would 
be a grater cost for analysts to bias their short-term forecasts in comparison to 
recommendations since the forecasts are more easily verifiable. Finally, according to Kadan et 
al. (2008) recommendations were the focal point of complaints about conflicts of interest 
before the renewal of regulations.
The recommendations are timed from -4Q to +4Q quarters surrounding the M&A del 
announcement. Thus I will have data on the recommendations for one year before and after 
the M&A announcement. My data consist merely of recommendations about the acquirer’s 
stock, since there was no recommendation data available for targets during the selected time 
period. However, the absence of target recommendations is not a severe drawback since, 
according to Bradley et al. (2007) the conflicts of interest issues are magnified in acquirer- 
client relationships. The acquiring firm will continue as a going concern whereas the target 
firm will not; therefore the probability of repeat business is near zero for target firms. Thus 
the main incentives for target-affiliated banks’ might probably be to close the deal with best 
possible terms in order to build reputation in the eyes of other potential targets. This can be 
done via recommendations about the acquirer’s stock. In addition, Kolasinski and Kothari 
(2007) are unable to find statistically significant results for recommendations about target’s 
stock.
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My recommendation data is a total of 6 278 recommendations, and the recommendations are 
controlled for both acquirer advisor and target advisor affiliation.
TABLE 4.2. Number of recommendations about acquirer’s stock issued by affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts in my sample of 814 M&A deals
Recommendation / 
Affiliation
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Target-affiliated 20 16 40 36 41 153
Acquirer-affiliated 9 18 57 63 90 236
Unaffiliated 406 607 1 602 1 608 1 666 5 889
Total 435 641 1 699 1 707 1 797 6 278
As can be seen from table 4.2, analysts in general seem to issue more positive than negative 
recommendations as discussed in section 2.2.1.
The recommendation data is retrieved from JCF database for institutional investors. JCF 
database is owned by a company called FactSet, and it provides data from several databases 
(FactSet Research Connect with over 400 research contributors, Reuters Research with over 
700 contributors, Thomson First Call Research with over 700 contributors, Thomson First 
Call BondCall with over 80 contributors and Thomson First Call Notes with over 200 
brokers) via a single interface. FactSet is a leading provider of financial information and 
analytic applications globally. The top ten investment banks and 95 of the world’s top one 
hundred asset managers use its services. The database includes analysis and recommendations 
of over 20 000 companies and is updated daily. The historical data on JCF database dates 
back to the beginning of 1990.
According to Ljungqvist et al. (2007), 54 729 analyst recommendations (out of a total of 
280 463) reported in the IBES database covering a time period of 1993-2002 have been 
altered after their original announcement. The changes include alterations of recommendation 
levels, additions and deletions of recommendations and removals of analyst names. In their 
study, Ljunqvist et al. (2007) conclude that the changes appear non-random across analysts, 
firms and brokerage houses and have a considerable impact on the overall distribution of 
recommendations across stocks and within individual stocks and brokerage firms. The 
changes also affect trading signals, back-testing inferences and track-records of individual 
analysts and models of analysts’ career outcomes.
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Previous studies have mostly based their analysis on IBES database. Thus by using the JCF 
database, I am able to gain access to a wider range of analyst research than the previous 
studies have had. The combination of several databases used in the JCF database might dim 
the possible bias resulting from the alterations of recommendations in IBES for years 2000- 
2002 even though my data is partially acquired from IBES. However, it is not possible to 
recognise the exact database from which each recommendation is originated and thus it can 
not be stated that the bias in IBES would be totally avoided in my data. As a matter of a fact, 
there were 368 recommendations where the firm and analyst issuing the recommendation are 
marked as “confidential”. I have removed these recommendations from my data.
4.1.3. Other data
The acquirer related control variables are collected from Bloomberg and SDC Platinum 
databases. Information about analyst affiliation and advisor relationships is gathered by hand 
from JCF and SDC databases. Analyst affiliation with advisor bank (either target or acquirer 
advisor) is used as a proxy for conflicts of interest. This is motivated by prior research 
findings that advisor relationships may result in biased recommendations (see for example 
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) and Bradley et al. (2007).
4.2. Methodology and variables
In this section, I first describe the methodologies used and then proceed to the description of 
both the dependent and explanatory variables.
4.2.1. Ordered logistic regression
Following Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) and Agrawal and Chen (2007), I will employ an 
ordered logistic regression analysis to determinate whether there is an association between 
analyst recommendations, M&A advisory relationship and other variables defined in section
4.2.2. Ordered logistic regression is used, rather than least squares, since the recommendation 
changes and levels are discrete and ordinal. The discrete and classifying nature of the 
dependent variable violates the assumptions used by traditional OLS regression. For example, 
the distributions of disturbance term or the dependent variables’ are not continuous or normal. 
Thus the standard errors and usual test statistics calculated by linear regression model would
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be invalid. In addition, since my dependent variables are ordinal, ordered logistic regression is 
preferred over multinomial logistic regression that would not be able to recognise the ordered 
form of my variables.
The ordered logistic regression examines the impact of a one unit change in the value of an 
independent variable to the log odds of a certain event happening; here the event is the 
appearance of a higher recommendation or recommendation revision. Logistic regression 
applies maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent into a logit variable 
(a natural logarithm of the odds of the dependent being in a higher rather than lower 
category). The odds ratio is defined as follows:
Odds ratio = oddstif the corresponding variable is incremented by 1) 
odds( if the variable is not incremented)
or, equivalently,
Odds ratio = Pfevent | x + 1 ) / (1 - P(event [ x + 1 ) ) (1)
P(event I x ) / (1 - P(event | x ) )
where P is probability of a certain event.
Ordered logistic regression as most discrete dependent models is presented in the form of 
index function model. Here each analyst’s recommendation is seen to depend on various 
measured characteristics of the deal, analyst affiliation, firm in question and certain 
unmeasured issues. The procedure relates the combined values of the measurable and 
immeasurable factors to the likelihood that an analyst will issue a particular recommendation 
on the stock in question. The index function is denoted as ß x which represents the influence 
of the measured factors. The influence of unmeasured factors is represented by e, and their 
combined influence is presented by:
y¡* = In (odds ratio) = a + ß x¡ + e¡ (2)
where ß are the coefficients to be estimated and the x¡ are the explanatory variables.
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The estimated b coefficients associated with explanatory variables are estimators of the 
change in the ordered log odds of the dependent variable caused by one unit change in the 
independent variable. Odds ratios can be estimated by using the exponentiated coefficients, 
i.e. the natural log base to the exponent b, where b is the parameter estimate.
The coefficient estimate b can be converted to the odds ratio by using the following equation:
Odds ratio = exp (b) (3)
Values Exp(b) > 1 mean the independent variable increases the odds (outcome more severe 
than i) and values Exp(b) < 1 mean that the independent variable decreases the odds (outcome 
more severe than /). Additionally negative (positive) coefficients mean that the odds (outcome 
more severe than /') decrease (increase) for one unit change in the independent variable.
4.2.2. Definitions and calculation of variables
This section presents my variables. I start by explaining my dependent variables and proceed 
to independent variables. Independent variables are divided into the same categories as my 
hypotheses in chapter 3.
Dependent variables
Absolute analyst recommendation. Absolute analyst recommendation is the observed single 
recommendation. Recommendations are coded so that a “Strong sell” is 1, “Sell” is 2, “Hold” 
is 3, “Buy” is 4 and “Strong buy” is 5. The variable is used to see whether affiliated analysts 
issue more positive recommendations such as “Strong buy” or “Buy” compared to unaffiliated 
analysts.
Recommendation revision. Recommendation revisions, i.e. upgrades and downgrades, are the 
differences between the same analyst’s previous and next recommendations. They are 
calculated by deducting the previous recommendation from the currently observed one and 
vary from -4 to +5. Thus if an analyst’s previous recommendation was 5 and current is 4, the 
revision would be a downgrade of -1. The highest value of 5 is achieved when the analyst 
issues her first recommendation about the company and that recommendation is a “Strong
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buy” recommendation. For the regression analysis, the values for revision variable are scaled 
so that downgrade is a value of -1, upgrade 1 and no change is 0.
Relative recommendations. Relative recommendations are used to measure the difference 
between consensus recommendation and a recommendation by a distinct analyst. Relative 
recommendations are studied to be able to see whether affiliated analysts are overly optimistic 
or pessimistic compared to unaffiliated analysts. The relative analyst recommendations are 
calculated following Agrawal and Chen (2007) methods. They measure the consensus 
recommendation as the median of all recommendations issued of a certain firm. I modify their 
approach so that I calculate the consensus recommendation from recommendations about a 
certain firm issued during the same quarter. The relative analyst recommendation is then 
calculated by deducting the consensus from the observed single recommendation.
Relative recommendation = RECkQi - Median RECkQ, (4)
Where RECkQi is a single recommendation issued about firm к at quarter / and Median RECkQ, 
is the consensus recommendation about firm к on quarter i. Quarters vary from -4Q to +4Q. 
Relative recommendations have values ranging from -4 to 5. The relative recommendation 
variable is scaled into three classes for my regression analysis: -1 (more pessimistic), +1 
(more optimistic) and 0 (same level) recommendation.
Independent variables 
Analyst report characteristics
Affiliation. I define an analyst to be affiliated if the analyst is employed by an investment 
bank acting as an advisor for either the acquirer or the target. Both target and advisor 
affiliations are considered as separate variables; acquirer-affiliation as AffiUcq and target- 
affiliation as Affiljarget-
Report timing. I define report timing by dividing the recommendations into quarters. If a 
recommendation is issued one year prior the M&A announcement, it is located in quarter 
-4Q, and if the recommendation is published one year after the deal announcement, it is 
located in quarter +4Q. The recommendations issued between the -4Q and +4Q are located in
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respective quarters as well. I use such a wide time window to be able to study if affiliated 
analysts start to alter their recommendations prior the announcement of the deal and if they 
provide positive research after the deal. Quarter -4Q can be seen as a neutral quarter since 
according to figures 3, 4 and 5 presented later in chapter 5, all analysts’ recommendations 
seem to be on the same level during that time. The recommendation publication dates are 
provided by the JCF database. In addition, two dummy variables, before and after are formed. 
Before refers to the situation where recommendation has been issued prior to the M&A deal 
announcement and after to a situation when recommendation is published after 
announcement.
Timing variable is used also in interaction variables Affiliation*After and Affiliation*Before 
for both target and acquirer affiliation in order to find out whether affiliated analysts issue 
different reports about the acquirer in different time periods surrounding the M&A 
announcement.
The quarter dummy variables are used as well in the formation of interaction terms 
Affiliation*Quarter for both acquirer and target affiliation. The motivation for these 
interaction terms rises from figure 3 presented later in the section 5.1.1. In figure 3 
recommendation patterns suggest that the direction of the recommendation revisions and the 
recommendation level seem to be related to the quarter during which they have been 
published.
Top 15 banks. As discussed in section 2.2.3, most reputable analysts are often hired by the 
best banks. Working for one of the top 15 largest investment banks in the market is used as a 
proxy for both analyst and bank reputation. A good reputation is a dear possession to both the 
bank and the analyst and it can affect their willingness to issue biased research. Banks in the 
15 largest investment banks group are recognised by measuring their market shares relative to 
other banks. Market share is measured as the number of deals advised by each bank. This 
follows loosely the procedure used by Meggison and Weiss (1991) who base their bank 
reputation measure on the market share of offer proceeds.
The underlying idea in using market shares as a proxy for reputation is that the quality of the 
banks is observed by the market. This observed quality generates more business to the bank 
and is thus seen in its market share. In my data the 15 largest banks are the following: ABN-
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AMRO, Morgan Stanley, UBS Investment bank, JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche Bank, Credit 
Suisse First Boston, Lazard, SEB Enskilda, Goldman Sachs, BNP Paribas, Rothschild, Merrill 
Lynch, Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, Carnegie and Citigroup. There are 1 762 
recommendations issued by the top 15 banks in my sample. The dummy variable Top 15 
equals 1 if the recommending analysts’ employer bank belongs to the group specified above 
and 0 otherwise.
Deal specific variables
Form of payment. As presented in the literature review, form of payment has an impact on 
shareholder returns in M&A deals. Form of payment is defined between the usage of cash and 
stock as a payment instrument in the deal. The form of payment is regarded to be stock if at 
least 50% stock financing is used and then the dummy variable stock equals 1. Otherwise 
dummy variable stock is 0. In my sample this results in 1 496 recommendations. Related to 
this, I use the M&A announcement date as a proxy for the stock exchange ratio date. This 
follows the procedure in Kolasinski and Kothari (2007). As Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) 
discuss, SDC does not make the exact exchange ratio date available and the exchange ratio is 
fixed in most M&A deals on the announcement date.
Deal value. Deal value is measured as the natural logarithm of the total amount paid by the 
acquirer. It is used to measure the importance of the deal to the investment bank. Hence, it is 
used as a proxy of fees generated via the deal, since as discussed in section 2.3.1, investment 
banking fees are closely related to the deal value. Actual fees are not used since they are 
scarcely available. Deal value can also be associated with analyst incentives since larger deals 
usually result in larger bonuses for affiliated analysts if they assist in closing the deal as 
discussed in section 2.2.3. To see the above mentioned joint effects, deal value is used to 
compose the interaction term Affiliation * Deal value for both acquirer- and target-affiliation. 
The interaction variable separates large deals from smaller ones and thus provides more 
information than the affiliation variable that treats all deals equivalently.
Attitude. Deal attitude is used to measure if hostile deals result in different analyst behaviour. 
This is especially interesting with regard to target affiliated analysts since they face conflicts 
of interests in maximising their fee generation (i.e. closing the deal) and their client firm's 
best interest. Variable Hostile has a value 1 if the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise.
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Deal timine variables
Bear vs. Bull market. Years 1996-2000 and 2004-2006 are regarded as bull markets in my 
study. Likewise, years 2000-2003 are bear market years. (See figure 2). The market index 
used to proxy for bear and bull markets is S&P350 index consisting of 350 largest European 
stocks. The dummy variable Bull equals 1 if the market situation was bullish and 0 otherwise.
High vs. low M&A activity. Years 2000 and 2004-2006 are high volume years in M&A 
market in my data sample (see figure 1). This variable is used as a proxy of investment bank 
competition, since during a high volume market there is more competition than when the 
volumes are low, as discussed in literature review in section 2.3.2. The dummy variable 
M&A Vol equals 1 if the recommendation has been issued during high M&A activity period 
and 0 otherwise.
Before vs. after regulation changes. The European regulation changes came into force during 
the year 2003, as discussed in literature review in section 2.3.4. Thus the year 2003 is used as 
a boundary year when examining the possible effects of the regulation changes. The dummy 
variable RegChange equals 1 if the recommendation has been issued after 2003 and 0 
otherwise.
Control variables
Acquirer size. Acquirer size is defined as the natural logarithm of acquirer’s market value 14 
days prior to acquisition. All values are converted into euros with the closing currency rate of 
the same day.
Debt. Ratio of acquirer’s total debt to assets is measured at the financial year end prior to 
acquisition.
Market-to-book value. Ratio of acquirer’s market value of equity to book value of equity is 
measured at the financial year-end prior to acquisition.
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SameSic. Variable SameSic refers to industry sic-codes and it has the value 1 if the firms 
participating in the deal are from the same industry and value 0 otherwise. The SameSic 
variable takes into account the first two numbers in the sic-codes.
All variables are summarized in table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3 Panel A. Dependent and independent variables used in the thesis.
Variable Description Hypothesis
Dependent variables
Analyst recommendation Absolute recommendation values 1 (Strong sell), 2
(Sell), 3 (Hold), 4 (Buy), 5 (Strong buy)
Upgrade/downgrade Recommendation revision i.e. observed 
recommendation compared to the previous one issued 
by the same analyst. Values -1 (downgrade), 1
(upgrade), 0 (no change)
Relative recommendations Single analyst recommendation compared to consensus. 




Affil,cq 1 if the report is issued by an analyst employed by
acquirer advisor bank, 0 otherwise
H2, H3
Affil target 1 if the report is issued by an analyst employed by 
target advisor bank, 0 otherwise
H4, HI 1,
Before 1 if the report has been issued before the stock 
exchange ratio has been decided, 0 otherwise
H6, H8, H9
After 1 if the report has been issued after stock exchange
ratio has been decided, 0 otherwise
HI, H7
Quarter A series of dummy variables for the publication time of 
the analysts’ recommendations. Time is measured in 
quarters and varies from -4Q to +4Q.
HI,H6, H7, H8,
H9




Stock 1 if the stock financing percentage is at least 50
percent, 0 otherwise
H6, H7, H8, H9
Value Natural logarithm of the total consideration acquirer
paid for the target
HI0
Attitude 1 if the deal is hostile, 0 otherwise Hll
Deal timing
Bull 1 if the deal is done during bull market ( 1996-2000 and
2004-2006), 0 otherwise
HI3
HighVol 1 if the deal is done during high M&A volume period
(2000 and 2004-2006), 0 otherwise
HI2




TABLE 4.3 Panel B. Interaction and control variables used in the thesis.
Interaction variables
Affiliation*After Affiliation dummy * time dummy for after stock 
exchange ratio has been set. Takes value of 1 if 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations are issued after the 
deal announcement, 0 otherwise.
Hl, H7
Affiliation*Before Affiliation dummy * time dummy for before stock 
exchange ratio has been set. Takes value of 1 if 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations are issued before 
the deal announcement, 0 otherwise.
H6, H8, H9
Affiliation *deal value Target / acquirer affiliation dummy * deal value H10
Quarter * Affiliation Series of dummy variables for quarter and analyst 
affiliation for both target and acquirer. Takes value of 1 




Topi 5 * High Vol Takes on value 1 if the recommendation is issued by an 
Top 15 bank hired analyst during High volume years, 0 
otherwise
H12
Topi5 * Bull Takes on value 1 if the recommendation is issued by an 
Topi5 bank hired analyst during Bull market years, 0 
otherwise
H13
Top15 * RegChange Takes on value 1 if the recommendation is issued by an 
Topl5 bank hired analyst after year 2003, 0 otherwise
H14
Affiliation * HighVol Takes on value 1 if the recommendation is issued by an 
affiliated analyst during High volume years, 0 otherwise
H12
Affiliation * Bull Takes on value 1 if the recommendation is issued by an 
affiliated analyst during Bull market years, 0 otherwise
H13
Affiliation * RegChange Takes on value 1 if the recommendation is issued by an 
affiliated analyst after year 2003, 0 otherwise
H14
Control variables
Size Acquirer size is calculated as natural logarithm of 
acquirer market value 14 days prior to the acquisitions 
(in EUR million)
All
Debt Ratio of acquirer’s total debt to assets is measured at the 
financial year end prior to acquisition
All
MBval Ratio of acquirer’s market value of equity to book value 
of equity is measured at the financial year-end prior to 
acquisition
All
SameSic Dummy variables for industry sic-codes. 1 if the firms 




I perform three groups of regressions, one group for every dependent variable. The 
regressions are controlled for White’s test for heteroscedasticity. First group is for absolute 
analyst recommendations and studies how affiliation affects absolute recommendation levels. 
Second group of regression models is run on relative recommendations to examine if 
affiliated analysts are overly optimistic compared to unaffihated analysts. Third group of 
regression models is run on recommendation revisions to see whether affiliated analysts 
upgrade acquirer stock more than unaffiliated analysts.
All regressions are run separately for both target-affiliation (Affiljarget) and acquirer-affiliation 
(AffiUcq) which is marked by writing term AffilTargeUcq in the models. Also the interaction 
terms are formed for both classes of affiliation respectively. In addition, all models are run for 
a dummy variable Topi 5, which is a variable for an analyst working for one of the 15 banks 
having largest market share in my sample. Interaction terms have been formed for Topi5 as 
well. Finally, regressions are run for Hostile-variable to study how the deal attitude effects the 
recommendations.
Model 1 analyses whether acquirer- or target-affiliation affects the probability of issuing a 
certain recommendation. Models include also deal value- and control variables.
Model 1 : P(Rec) = A ( a + ßi AffilTargc,.Acq + ß2Value + controls + s)
where A is the logistic cumulative distribution function and Rec is the recommendation 
variable that can take one of five values: 1 if the recommendation is a “Strong sell”, 2 if the 
recommendation is a “Sell”, 3 if the recommendation is a “Hold”, 4 if the recommendation is 
a “Buy” and 5 if the recommendation is a “Strong buy”. Affiliation variables are dummy 
variables for analyst affiliation for both acquirer and target. Value variable is a variable for 
deal value. Control variables are the following: acquirer size, acquirer debt to assets ratio, 
acquirer market-to-book ratio and SameSic for industry sic-codes. See table 4.3 for detailed 
variable definitions.
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Affiliation dummy variables treat all deals equivalently. However, affiliated analysts’ 
incentives to issue biased recommendations may be grater in large deals, since deal size is 
correlated with M&A fees. To see this possible effect, I run Model 2, to which I add an 
interaction term between Value and each affiliation dummy variables in turn.
Model 2: P(Rec) = A ( a + ßiAffilTarget,Acq + p2Value + ß3Value*AffilTarget,Acq + controls
+ e)
Model 3 is run in order to see whether affiliated analysts are more probable to issue optimistic 
recommendations after the deal is announced and the stock exchange ratio set.
Model 3: P(Rec) = A ( a + ßiAffilTarget,Acq + ß2Value + ß3After + ß4After*AffiTarget,Acq +
controls + e)
Model 4 is run to see whether affiliated analysts are more probable to issue more optimistic 
recommendations prior the M&A deal is announced. Same results can be inferred to some 
extent from the previous model, but model 4 is run to study the timing more carefully.
Model 4: P(Rec) = A ( a + ßiAffiliargetAcq + ß3Value + ß3Before +
ß4Before* AffilTarget,Acq + Controls + E)
To see whether stock financing affects the probability of affiliated analysts issuing higher 
recommendations, model 5 is run. The model includes an interaction term between analyst 
affiliation and stock deal dummy and it separates the affiliated analysts’ recommendations 
about acquirers in stock financed deals from the recommendations about acquirers in cash 
financed deals.
Model 5: P(Rec) = A ( a + ßiAffllTarget,Acq + ß2Value + ß3Stock + ß4StOCk*AffllTarget,Acq
+ controls + e)
Model 6 is run to see whether recommendation issuance quarter has an effect on the 
probability of issuing a higher recommendation. Quarter refers to a set of dummy variables 
for quarters from -4Q to +4Q surrounding the M&A deal announcement on quarter OQ. For
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example, for a recommendation issued during the preceding quarter to the M&A deal 
announcement, Quarter variable used is -IQ.
Model 6: P(Rec) = Л ( a + ß|AffilTarget.Acq + ß2Value + ß3Quarter +
ß4Quarter*AffilTarget,Acq + controls + e)
To identify whether affiliation has a greater effect on recommendations during different time 
periods specified in the variables description section (Bull-market, High M&A volume market 
and prior regulation change in 2003), I add dummy variables for those time periods and form 
Models 7, 8 and 9.
Model 7: P(Rec) = A ( a + ßlAffilTarget,Acq + ß2Value + ß3Bull + controls + e)
Models 8 and 9 are similar to Model 7 except ß3Bull variable is replaced by variables 
M&AVol in model 8 and RegChange in model 9.
Finally, models 10-12 are run to see whether the combined effect of affiliation and different 
time periods have an effect on the probability of issuing a higher recommendation.
Model 10: P(Rec) = A ( a + ßiAffilTarget.Acq + ß2 Value + ß3Bull + ß4 B u 11 * A ffi liargct. Acq +
controls + e)
Models 11 and 12 are similar to model 10 except ß4Bull*Affil,arget.Acq variables are replaced 
by dummy variables both target and acquirer affiliation and M&AVol dummy variable in 
model 11 and RegChange dummy variable in model 12.
Relative recommendations
I run Models 1 - 12 on relative recommendations as well. The models are formed as presented 
above, separately for both target- and acquirer-affiliation and Top 15 banks dummy. These 
regressions are run to see whether affiliated analysts issue overly optimistic or pessimistic 
recommendations compared to unaffiliated analysts. These models estimate the probability of 




I run Models 1-12 on recommendation revisions to see how affiliation affects 
recommendation revisions. The models are formed as presented above, separately for both 
target- and acquirer-affiliation and Topi5 banks dummy. These models estimate the 
probability of a recommendation revision that has values -1 (downgrade), +1 (upgrade) and 0 
(no change).
5. Results
My results are presented in this section. I start by presenting the results related to absolute 
recommendation levels. Then I proceed to the relative recommendations and conclude this 
section by reporting results for the analysis on recommendation revisions. I start each section 
by presenting descriptive and summary data and proceed to regression analysis results. I 
report regression parameter estimates as coefficients not as odds ratios, even though odds 
ratios are presented for a part of the results to get a better understanding of the magnitude of 
the coefficients. The coefficients associated with explanatory variables are estimators of the 
change in the log odds of the dependent caused by a unit change in the independent. Positive 
(negative) b coefficients indicate that the explanatory variable increases (decreases) the log 
odds of the dependent. The odds ratios in turn are estimators of the factor by which the 
odds(outcome more severe than /) change for a one-unit change in the explanatory variable. 
An odds ratio grater (smaller) than 1 means that the unit change in the independent variable 
increases (decreases) the odds(outcome more severe than /).
The expected sign in each regression result table refers to the expected sign of the estimated 
coefficients based on my hypotheses presented in chapter 3. For example, an expected 
negative sign is marked as - and refers to a situation where I expect based on my hypotheses 
that the estimated coefficient has a negative, i.e. diminishing, effect on the odds of the 
dependent variable being in higher class versus the combined lower classes.
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5.1. Absolute recommendation levels
5.1.1. Descriptive and summary data
Table 5.1 below presents the minimum, mean and maximum recommendations by affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts. As shown in table 5.1 below, target-affiliated analysts’ mean and 
median recommendations are below those of both unaffiHated and acquirer-affiliated analysts’ 
in my sample. In addition, the mean value of acquirer-affiliated analysts’ recommendations is 
above that of unaffiliated analysts’. These results suggest that there might be evidence that 
acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more optimistic “Strong buy” and “Buy” recommendations 
than unaffiliated and target-affiliated analysts. In addition, results presented in table 5.1 
suggest that target-affiliated analysts issue more pessimistic “Strong sell” and “Sell” 
recommendations about the acquirer than acquirer-affiliated and unaffiliated analysts.
TABLE 5.1: Minimum, mean and maximum values for absolute recommendation levels divided 
by analyst affiliation
Affiliation Min Mean Median Max N
Target 1 3.338 3 5 153
Acquirer 1 3.883 4 5 236
Unaffiliated 1 3.599 4 5 5 889
Total 6 278
Table 5.2 on page 63 shows the distribution of the recommendations by analyst affiliation and 
quarters surrounding the M&A deal announcement. Also the percentage shares of each 
recommendation level by analyst affiliation are reported. Percentages in table 5.2 suggest that 
in my sample target-affiliated analysts have issued nearly double as much “Strong sell” 
recommendations as unaffi Hated analysts and the consensus. In contrast, acquirer-affiliated 
analysts have issued clearly less “Strong sell” and “Sell” recommendations than unaffiliated 
analysts. In addition, acquirer-affiliated analysts have issued about ten percents more “Strong 
buy” recommendations than target-affiliated analysts, unaffiliated analysts and the consensus.
As can be seen from table 5.2, recommendations are fairly evenly distributed before and after 
the M&A deal announcement. For acquirer-affiliated analysts and unaffiliated analysts, there
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are slightly more recommendations issued after the deal announcement though, 57 percents 
and 52 percents respectively. In contrast, target-affiliated analysts have issued 56 percent of 
their recommendations about the acquirer prior the deal announcement. Despite of 72 
recommendations, all recommendations have been issued on a different quarter than the 
original M&A announcement.
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TABLE 5.2 The distribution of absolute recommendations into quarters for all deals data. Panel 
A shows target affiliated recommendations, panel В acquirer affiliated, panel C unaffiliated and panel 
D total distribution of recommendations.
Panel A: Target-affiliated recommendations
Quarter/
Recommendation -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 Total
%
of total
1 2 3 5 3 4 0 2 1 20 13.1%
2 5 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 16 10.1%
3 5 10 3 5 4 5 5 3 40 26.5%
4 9 4 5 2 4 5 5 2 36 23.5%
5 5 3 5 6 3 11 7 1 41 26.8%
Total 26 22 20 18 17 22 19 9 153
Panel B: Acquirer-affiliated recommendations
Quarter/
Recommendation -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 Total
%
of total
1 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 9 3.8%
2 4 4 0 3 0 3 1 1 2 18 7.6%
3 7 8 9 6 0 6 7 9 5 57 24%
4 4 4 3 10 0 15 6 7 13 63 26.6%
5 6 5 11 14 0 13 17 12 12 90 38%
Total 22 23 23 33 0 40 31 30 34 236
Panel C: Unaffiliated recommendations
Quarter / 
Recommendation -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 Total
%
of total
1 51 38 47 44 4 55 60 58 49 406 6.9%
2 53 62 82 74 2 96 86 66 86 607 10.3%
3 168 191 218 211 21 195 215 187 196 1 602 27.2%
4 152 195 211 189 23 233 182 221 202 1 608 27.3%
5 166 225 196 212 21 238 210 203 195 1 666 28.3%
Total 590 711 754 730 71 817 753 735 728 5 889
Panel D: Total recommendations
Quarter / 
Recommendation -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 Total
%
of total
1 54 43 52 47 4 62 60 61 52 435 6.9%
2 62 68 84 79 2 101 88 67 90 641 10.2%
3 180 209 230 222 21 205 227 201 204 1 699 27.1%
4 165 203 219 201 23 252 193 233 217 1 707 27.2%
5 177 233 212 232 21 254 238 222 208 1 797 28.6%
Total 638 756 797 781 71 874 806 784 771 6 278
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FIGURE 3: Analyst average recommendations for acquirer firms by quarter.
Quarter
—Acquirer-affiliated —A— Target-affiliated------ Unaffiliated
Figure 3 plots acquirer-affiliated, target-affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations for 
acquirer firms for the two-year period surrounding the announcement of the M&A deal. Target-and 
acquirer-affiliated analyst recommendations were not issued during quarter 0. Quarters are presented 
in X axis and quarter 0 represents M&A deal announcement quarter.
Figure 3 presents the average recommendations by each analyst group by quarters. Results 
presented in figure 3 are in line with the results of tables 5.1 and 5.2. and suggest that 
affiliated analysts recommendation issuing behaviour follows my hypotheses of acquirer- 
affiliated analysts issuing more optimistic “Strong buy” and “Buy” recommendations 
surrounding the M&A deal announcement. In addition, there is a clear upgrade in the 
acquirer-affiliated analysts’ recommendations between quarters -3Q and -2Q, and acquirer- 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations stay on the upgraded level nearly whole period after the 
M&A deal as well. There seems to be a slight downgrade during quarter +2Q, but the 
acquirer-affiliated analysts’ recommendation level does not fall into the level prior the 
upgrade during quarter -3Q.
The behaviour of target-affiliated analysts in figure 3 seems to back up my hypotheses of 
target-affiliated analysts downgrading acquirer stock before stock exchange ratio setting and 
upgrading acquirer stock after the exchange ratio has been decided. The results presented in 
figure 3 imply that target-affiliated analysts issue lower recommendation about acquirer’s 
stock during quarters -3Q and -IQ and then sharply upgrade the stock during quarter +2Q 
after the deal has been announced. Target-affiliated analysts’ recommendations seem to 
revert to the original level quite rapidly during quarters +3Q and +4Q which suggests that the
65
upgrade in quarter IQ may not represent their honest opinion about the acquirer. However, 
the time period between the quarters +3Q and +4Q and the M&A announcement date is quite 
long and thus there can be additional information affecting the target-affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations. On the other hand, it can be assumed that also unaffiliated analysts would 
react similarly to bad news. However, their recommendations are quite steady during the time 
period between quarters -4Q and +4Q.
The pattern of acquirer- and target-affiliated analysts’ recommendations in figure 3 suggests 
that the recommendation levels and revisions might be related to a specific quarter 
surrounding the M&A announcement. Thus I add interaction terms for quarters from -4Q to 
+4Q and both acquirer-affiliation and target-affiliation into my regression models.
The yearly division of the recommendations is presented in table 5.3. Recommendations are 
allocated mainly to years onwards from the year 2000 since there are more M&A deals 
relating to those years compared to the early years in my sample. The most interesting issue in 
table 5.3 is the distribution of recommendations into different categories. A study by Kadan et 
al. (2008), reports that the regulation changes in the USA converted analysts’ 
recommendation scale from five category scale to three category scale after the new 
regulations from year 2002 onwards. There is no similar effect in my data. On the contrary, 
the scale has changed from three categories into five during years 1997 and 1998 and stayed 
as a five category scale regardless of the regulation changes during 2003. It is interesting to 
find such a different result compared to the USA since the new regulation frameworks 
entailed quite similar changes in both regions and the same banks are more or less operating 
in both continents.
TABLE 5.3. The yearly division of analysts’ recommendations
Year /
Recommendation 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1 4 16 26 22 30 48 33 31 34 48 72 53 18
2 1 31 115 106 84 66 65 88 67 18
3 15 49 76 81 108 181 238 113 143 249 232 161 53
4 2 102 334 348 179 138 203 227 129 45
5 8 56 98 88 144 275 216 102 96 216 242 194 62
Grand Total 27 121 200 194 415 953 941 509 477 781 861 604 196
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Table 5.4 presents the recommendation distribution by quarters and affiliation for stock 
financed deals. Stock deal data is presented because the stock value has an effect on the deal 
terms and price in stock deals contrary to cash deals and thus analysts’ recommendations on 
acquirer’s stock can be used as strategic tools in stock financed deals.
There are 1 564 stock financed deals in my sample. 36 percent of target-affiliated and 22 
percent of acquirer-affiliated recommendations have been issued surrounding stock-financed 
deals. Here the deal is considered as a stock deal if at least 50 percent of stock financing is 
used. There are quite large differences when the stock deal data is compared to the same data 
for all deals in the sample (see table 5.2). The largest difference seems to be that target- 
affiliated analysts issue less “Strong sell” and “Hold” recommendations in stock deals and 
that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more “Strong sell” and “Sell” recommendations in stock 
deals. For example, 13,1% of target-affiliated analysts’ recommendations are “Strong sell” 
recommendations in all data sample but for stock financed data the percentage is merely 
3,6%. The largest difference in acquirer-affiliated analysts’ recommendations can be seen in 
the percentage share of “Sell” recommendations. For stock financed deals, 20,8% of acquirer- 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations are “Sell” recommendations compared to the percentage 
of merely 7,6% “Sell” recommendations for all stock data. Unaffiliated analysts’ 
recommendations are quite near the levels presented in table 5.2.
The reasons behind the deviating results might be, for example, that target-affiliated analysts 
try to maximise the deal price by issuing higher recommendations about the acquirer’ share. 
This would both benefit their customer and maximise banking fees. Acquirer-affiliated 
analysts in turn might try to maximise their own reputational benefits by anticipating the 
forthcoming drop in acquirer’s share price after the announcement of the M&A deal.
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TABLE 5.4: Absolute recommendation distribution into quarters for stock deal data. Panel A 
shows target affiliated recommendations, panel В acquirer affiliated, panel C unaffiliated and panel D 
total distribution of recommendations.
Panel A: Target-affiliated recommendations
Quarter / 
Recommendation -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 Total
%
of total
1 1 1 2 3,6 %
2 2 2 1 1 1 7 12,5%
3 2 1 1 2 6 10,7%
4 5 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 24 42,9 %
5 4 1 3 1 5 3 17 30,4 %
Total 13 6 6 5 5 11 6 4 56
Panel B: Acquirer-affiliated recommendations
Quarter / 
Recommendation -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 Total
%
of total
1 1 2 3 5,7 %
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 11 20,8 %
3 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 10 18,9%
4 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 12 22,6 %
5 2 1 3 2 5 3 1 17 32,1 %
Total 7 4 1 8 10 8 7 8 53
Panel C: Unaffiliated recommendations
Quarter / 
Recommendation -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 Total
%
of total
1 14 13 12 15 17 16 18 18 123 8,4 %
2 20 10 18 24 26 29 18 25 170 11,6%
3 40 50 56 43 34 37 44 56 360 24,6 %
4 37 46 53 42 64 51 64 51 408 27,9 %
5 27 54 50 51 49 62 57 51 401 27,4 %
Total 138 173 189 175 190 195 201 201 1 462
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5.1.2. Regression results
This section presents my ordered regression results for absolute recommendation levels. 
Results related to analyst affiliation, deal value and reputation are tabulated in table 5.5. 
Results related to deal timing are presented in table 5.6 and results related to dynamic analyst 
behaviour surrounding M&A deal announcement are presented in tables 5.7 and 5.8. In all 
tables, panel A presents the result related to the acquirer-affiliation and Panel В the results 
related to target-affiliation.
As can be seen from table 5.5, acquirer-affiliation coefficients are all positive and for models 
1 and 5 they are statistically significant at 1% level. The positive coefficient in model 1 means 
that if an analyst is acquirer-affiliated, the log odds of issuing a higher recommendation 
increase by 0,433. This coefficient converts to an odds ratio of 1,54 which in turn means that 
the odds of recommendation being on a higher level compared to the combined lower 
categories is 1,54 times as large for recommendations issued by acquirer-affiliated analysts 
than for other analysts. These results imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more high 
category recommendations and give support to my hypotheses of acquirer-affiliated analysts 
issuing more positive “Strong buy” and “Buy” recommendations and are in line with the 
results presented in figure 3.
The variable deal value has statistically significant positive coefficients in all models in table 
5.5, which implies that the odds of issuing a higher recommendation increases when deal 
value increases. However, the deal value variable does not discriminate between affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts recommendations. Thus the interaction term AffiUcq* Deal Val is formed 
to be able to see whether the acquirer-affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations if the 
deal value is larger. The interaction term has a positive coefficient as well, even though it is 
not statistically significant.
The control variable SameSic has negative and significant coefficients for all models reported 
in table 5.5. These results imply that the odds of issuing a higher recommendation decrease if 
the firms participating in the deal are from the same industry group. For example, the 
SameSic coefficient -0,107 in model 1 converts to an odds ratio of 0,899 which means that the 
odds of issuing a higher recommendation is 0,899 times higher if the firms are from the same 
industry compared to a deal where the firms are from separate industries. In addition, control
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variable size (acquirer market value) has positive and significant coefficients which suggest 
that the larger the acquirer, the higher are the recommendations about its stock.
The negative coefficient on AffilAcq*Stock suggests that stock financing might result in lower 
recommendations by acquirer-affiliated analysts, which contradicts hypothesis that acquirer- 
affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations when a deal is stock finances to sweeten the 
terms for their client firms. On the contrary, the results suggest that my hypothesis of 
affiliated analysts issuing lower recommendations prior to deal announcement to improve 
their reputation might be valid. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant.
TABLE 5.5 Panel A. Results related to affiliation, deal value and reputation. Panel A presents the 
coefficients estimated and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The 
dependent variable has discrete values ranging from 1 to 5. 1 represents “Strong sell” recommendation, 2 “Sell”, 
3 “Hold”, 4 “Buy” and 5 “Strong buy”. AffilTanie, and AffilAc<l are dummy variables for affiliation and take on 
value 1 if the recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Ка/ие-variable is the natural 
logarithm of the deal value, Stock variable takes on value I if the deal was at least 50% stock financed, 0 
otherwise. SameSic variable takes the value 1 if the acquirer and target firms are operating in the same industry, 
0 otherwise. S/ze-variable is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MB Val is acquirer’s market-to- 
book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the 
acquisition and other control variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the acquisition. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. "‘Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
PANEL A
Variable Exp. Model Model Model
Sign 1 2 5
AffÏAcq + 0,433*** 0,182 0,552***
(0,121) (0,398) (0,131)
Value + 0,033** 0,025** 0,026**
(0,012) (0,012) (0,012)






SameSic ? -0,107** -0,011** -0,109**
(0,049) (0,050) (0,049)
Size 0,022* 0,022* 0,022*
(0,012) (0,012) (0,012)
MBVal -0,029 -0,030** -0,029**
(0,012) (0,012) (0,012)
Debt 0,002 0,002 0,002
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 6 278
Chi2 42,26 44,3 41,67
Significance 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001
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Panel В next page presents the results for target-affiliation, deal value and reputation. The 
negative coefficients on AffilTarget-variable in models 1 and 5 suggest that target-affiliation 
decreases the log odds of a higher recommendation level. For example, the coefficient on 
variable Affiljarget in model 5 converts to an odds ratio of 0,501 which means that the odds of 
issuing a higher recommendation increases by a factor of 0,501 if the Affiljarget variable goes 
from 0 to 1. In other words, the odds of issuing a higher recommendation decrease to 
approximately half if the recommendation is issued by a target-affiliated analyst compared to 
a recommendation that is issued by other than target-affiliated analyst. These results provide 
support for my hypothesis that target-affiliated analysts issue less optimistic recommendations 
about the acquirer.
Interestingly, however, the coefficient on target-affiliation variable is positive and statistically 
significant in model 2. This is probably caused by the interaction variable AffilTarget*DealVal 
which is added to the model. The Affiljarget*DealVal variable has a statistically significant 
negative coefficient. Thus for a one unit increase in the Affiljarget* DealVal -variable the odds 
that a recommendation is higher increase by a factor of 0,739 (coefficient -0,303). In other 
words, the results suggest that target-affiliated analysts issue lower recommendations if the 
deal value is larger. This result gives support to my hypothesis that the bias in affiliated 
analysts’ recommendations is larger when deal value is larger. The hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that affiliated analysts’ incentives to bias their research might be grater in large 
deals since deal size is correlated with M&A fees. The positive coefficient on Affiljarget in 
model 2 imply that for other than large deals, the odds that the recommendation is higher 
increase by a factor of 4,560 if the recommendation is issued by a target-affiliated analyst.
The coefficient on Affil[argc,* Stock is positive and significant. Thus stock financing of at least 
50 percents increases the odds that a target-affiliated analyst issues a higher recommendation 
by a factor of 3,050. The results suggest that target-affiliated analysts issue higher 
recommendations when stock financing is used. This result confirms the results presented in 
table 5.4 in page 68 and might be caused by target-affiliated analysts aim to maximise deal 
value and benefit both their client and the bank. However, most of my hypotheses relate the 
form of payment with report timing variables which are studied later in this section.
Control variable SameSic has negative and significant coefficients for target-affiliation as it 
did for acquirer-affiliation. In addition, acquirer’s market-to-book ratio has negative and
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significant coefficients. Regressions are run on Topi5 explanatory variable as well, but the 
results are statistically insignificant and thus not tabulated. Regressions are run on Hostile 
explanatory variable as well to see if the affiliated analysts' behaviour is different in hostile 
deals. The results are insignificant and are not tabulated.
TABLE 5.5 Panel B. Results related to affiliation, deal value and reputation. Panel A presents the 
coefficient estimated and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The dependent 
variable has discrete values ranging from 1 to 5. I represents “Strong sell” recommendation, 2 “Sell”, 3 “Hold”, 
4 “Buy” and 5 “Strong buy”. AfftlTav, and AffilAcq are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value 1 if the 
recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise, Ра/ие-variable is the natural logarithm of the 
deal value. Stock variables takes on value 1 if the deal was at least 50% stock financed, 0 otherwise. SameSic 
variable takes the value 1 if the acquirer and target firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. Size- 
variable is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MBVal is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt 
is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other 
control variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the acquisition. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ‘Significant at 10%, “ Significant at 5%. *“ Significant at 1%
PANEL В
Variable Exp. Model Model Model
Sign 1 2 5
Affiling« -0,264* 1,525“ -0,692“
(0,167) (0,600) (0,219)








SameSic ? -0,109** -0,122“ -0,112**
(0,049) (0,049) (0,049)
Size -0,0002 0,017 0,019
(0,003) (0,012) (0,012)
MBVal -0,029** -0,027** -0,027“
(0,012) (0,012) (0,012)
Debt 0,002 0,002 0,002
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 6 278
Chf 31,93 41,89 37,76
Significance 0,0041 0,0002 0,0001
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Results related to deal timing are presented in the table 5.6 next page. The coefficients on 
acquirer-affiliation are positive for this set of models as well and thus the results suggest that 
acquirer-affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations about the acquirer compared to the 
other analysts in my sample. However, the statistically significant negative coefficient on 
variable RegChange*AffilACq suggests that the log odds of a higher recommendation 
decreases if the recommendation is issued by an acquirer-affiliated analyst after the European 
regulation changes in 2003. The coefficient converts to an odds ratio of 0,569 which means 
that the odds of a higher recommendation issued by an acquirer-affiliated analyst versus the 
combined lower recommendation categories is nearly the half of the odds compared to a 
recommendation issued prior the recommendation change. The variable RegChange has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient as well. These findings suggest that the 
recommendations issued after the European regulation changes are lower than the 
recommendations issued before the recommendation changes. These results provide support 
for my hypothesis that the increased regulation and disclosure requirements resulted in lower 
and thus probably less biased acquirer-affiliated analyst recommendations.
The positive coefficient on variable HighVol suggest that the recommendations issued by 
other than acquirer-affiliated analysts during high M&A volume periods are higher than the 
recommendations issued during other time periods. The coefficient on acquirer-affiliation 
related interaction term is positive as well but not statistically significant. The results for 
bullish market environment suggest similarly that other than acquirer-affiliated analysts seem 
to issue higher recommendations during market upturns. Again the coefficient on acquirer- 
affiliation is in line with the coefficient on bull-variable but is not statistically significant.
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TABLE 5.6 Panel A. Results related to deal timing. Panel A presents the estimated coefficients and standard 
errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The dependent variable has discrete values 
ranging from I to 5. I represents “Strong sell” recommendation, 2 “Sell”, 3 “Hold”, 4 “Buy” and 5 “Strong 
buy”. Affilié, and AffilЛсч are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value I if the recommendation is 
given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Bull refers to the market situation and it takes on value I if the 
deal is done during bull market (years 1996-2000 and 2004-2006), 0 otherwise. HighVol variable takes on value 
I if the deal is done during high M&A volume period (years 2000 and 2004-2006), 0 otherwise. RegChange 
takes on value 1 if deal is done after the European regulation changes (2003), 0 otherwise. SameSic variable 
takes the value 1 if the acquirer and target firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. Szze-variable is 
the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MBVal is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s 
debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other control 
variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the acquisition Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
PANEL A 
Variable Exp. Model Model Model Model Model Model
Sign 7 8 9 10 II 12
AffÜAcq + 0,433** 0,444*** 0,425*** 0,267 0,312 0,650***
(0,122) (0,121) (0,121) (0,251) (0,216) (0,144)
Bull + 0,379*** 0,372***
(0,379) (0,053)










SameSic ? -0,051 -0,091* -0,139*** -0,050 -0,089* -0,133***
(0,050) (0,049) (0,050) (0,050) (0,049) (0,050)
Size 0,044*** 0,040*** 0,022* 0,044*** 0,040*** 0,023**
(0,013) (0,013) (0,012) (0,013) (0,013) (0,012)
MBVal -0,033*** -0,034*** -0,022* -0,033*** -0,035*** -0,022*
(0,012) (0,012) (0,012) (0,012) (0,012) (0,012)
Debt 0,000 0,001 0,003* 0,001 0,001 0,002*
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 6 278 6 278 6 278 6 278
Chi2 90,46 65,59 49,2 90,56 66,24 57,67
Significance 0,0000 0,0001 0,0001 0,0000 0,0001 0,0001
Panel В on page 75 presents the deal timing related results for target-affiliation. AffilTarget has 
a negative coefficient in all models except model 10. Only the coefficient in model 7 is 
statistically significant. However, the results suggest that target-affiliated analysts issue lower 
recommendations about acquirer’s stock than other analysts. The positive coefficient in model 
10 is statistically insignificant as the negative coefficient on Bull* AffilTarget-
However, the coefficient on Bull-variable is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. 
The Bull-variable’s coefficient in model 10 converts to an odds ratio of 1,487 which means
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that for a one unit increase in Bull-variable, the odds of a higher level recommendation versus 
combined lower level recommendations is 1,487 times grater. Thus the results imply that 
other than target-affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations during Bull-markets 
compared to other market conditions which confirms the results presented in panel A.
HighVol variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient as was the case in 
panel A. The result suggests that the recommendations issued by other analysts than target- 
affiliated analysts during high M&A deal volume period are more probably of a higher 
category than recommendations issued during other time periods. The coefficient on 
interaction term between target-affiliation and HighVol is negative which suggests that target- 
affiliated analysts issue lower recommendations during high M&A volume periods compared 
to other periods. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant.
As in panel A, the coefficient on regulation change-variable is negative and significant. Thus 
the results on target-affiliation related model suggest that the log odds of a higher category 
recommendation versus the lower categories deteriorate if the recommendation is issued by 
other than target-affiliated analyst after the European regulation change in 2003. The 
coefficient on interaction term between target-affiliation and regulation change is negative as 
well but not statistically significant. These results imply that recommendations issued after 
regulation change are lower than the ones issued prior the change.
Regressions are run on Topl5 explanatory variable as well, but the results are statistically 
insignificant and thus are not tabulated here. Regressions are run on Hostile explanatory 
variable as well to see if the affiliated analysts’ behaviour is different in hostile deals. The 
results are insignificant and are not tabulated.
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TABLE 5.6 Panel В. Results related to deal timing. Panel A presents the estimated coefficients and standard 
errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The dependent variable has discrete values 
ranging from 1 to 5. 1 represents “Strong sell” recommendation, 2 “Sell”, 3 “Hold”, 4 “Buy” and 5 “Strong 
buy”. Affile, and AffilAc4 are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value I if the recommendation is 
given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Bull refers to the market situation and it takes on value I if the 
deal is done during bull market (years 1996-2000 and 2004-2006), 0 otherwise. HighVol variable takes on value 
1 if the deal is done during high M&A volume period (years 2000 and 2004-2006), 0 otherwise. RegChange 
takes on value I if deal is done after the European regulation changes (2003), 0 otherwise. SameSic variable 
takes the value I if the acquirer and target firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. S/ze-variable is 
the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MBVal is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s 
debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other control 
variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the acquisition Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
PANEL В
Variable Exp. Model Model Model Model Model Model
Sign 7 8 9 10 11 12
Affiljargct -0,273* -0,254 -0,259 0,190 -0,211 -0,096
(0,165) (0,164) (0,165) (0,354) (0,262) (0,213)
Bull + 0,383*** 0.397***
(0,053) (0,053)










SameSic ? -0,050 -0,091* -0,140*** -0,049 -0,090* -0,140***
(0,050) (0,049) (0,050) (0,050) (0,049) (0,050)
Size 0,040*** 0,035*** 0,018 0,041*** 0,036*** 0,018
(0,013) (0,013) (0,012) (0,013) (0,013) (0,012)
MBVal -0,033*** -0,034*** -0,022* -0,033*** -0,034*** -0,022*
(0,012) (0,012) (0,012) (0,012) (0,012) (0,012)
Debt 0,001 0,001 0,003** 0,001 0,001 0,003**
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 6 278 6 278 6 278 6 278
ChT 80,09 54,78 38,03 84,11 55,02 38,89
Significance 0,0000 0,0001 0,0001 0,0000 0,0001 0,0001
76
The results related to analysts’ recommendation behaviour surrounding the M&A deal 
announcement are reported in table 5.7 on page 77. Acquirer-affiliation has positive 
coefficients in both models 3 and 4 even though the coefficient in model 3 is not statistically 
significant. However, the coefficient on AffilACq*After interaction term is positive and 
significant. The coefficient on variable AffiUcq*After converts to an odds ratio of 1,528 
which implies that the odds of a higher level recommendation are 1,528 times grater if the 
acquirer-affiliated recommendation is issued after the M&A deal announcement.
In addition, the statistically significant negative coefficient on AffiUcq*Before -variable 
confirms the result of model 3, as expected. These results suggest that acquirer-affiliated 
analysts issue lower recommendations prior the deal announcement and higher 
recommendations after the deal announcement. Thus the results give support for my 
hypotheses that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations after the deal 
announcement. However, the results contradict my hypothesis of acquirer-affiliated analysts’ 
aim to improve the deal terms for their client firm by issuing higher recommendations prior 
the deal announcement. Additionally, the results are not in line with the selection bias 
hypotheses either. In addition, when the models 3 and 4 are run on stock deal data, the signs 
on variables AffilAcq*Before and AffiUcq*After are in line with the ones reported for all data 
sample. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the results 
might provide support for my hypothesis that affiliated analysts aim to enhance their 
reputation by downgrading acquirer’s stock prior the deal based on their inside information 
announcement as discussed in the literature section.
Control variable signs are in line with the previous results presented in this section.
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TABLE 5.7 Panel A. Results related to the analysts’ recommendation issuing behaviour surrounding 
M&A deal announcement. Panel A presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for acquirer- 
affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The dependent variable has discrete values ranging from I to 5. 1 
represents “Strong sell” recommendation, 2 “Sell”, 3 “Hold”, 4 “Buy” and 5 “Strong buy”. AffllTargel and AffilAcq 
are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value I if the recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst 
and 0 otherwise. After and Before are dummy variables for the time of the report issuance related to the M&A 
deal announcement. After variable takes on value I if the report has been announced after the deal 
announcement, 0 otherwise. Before variable takes on value 1 if the report has been issued prior the deal 
announcement, 0 otherwise. SameSic variable takes on the value I if the acquirer and target firms are operating 
in the same industry, 0 otherwise. S/ze-variable is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MBVal is 
acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 
days prior to the acquisition and other control variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the 
acquisition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 
1%
PANEL A All data All data > 50 % Stock > 50 % Stock
Variable Exp. Model Model Model Model
Sign 3 4 3 4
AffilAcq + 0,208 0,616*** -0,390 0,120
(0,185) (0,155) (0,451) (0,357)
After ? -0,016 0,068
(0,046) (0,092)
Before ? 0,019 -0,463
(0,046) (0,598)
AffllAcq*After + 0,424* 0,559
(0,242) (0,579)
AffilAcq*Before + -0,398* -0,463
(0,244) (0,598)
SameSic ? -0,113** -0,113** 0,241* 0,242**
(0,049) (0,049) (0,123) (0,123)
Size 0,027** 0,023* -0,023 -0,032
(0,012) (0,012) (0,023) (0,022)
MBVal -0,028** -0,028** -0,128** -0,127***
(0,012) (0,012) (0,026) (0,026)
Debt 0,002 0,002 -0,001 -0,001
(0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0.003)
Number of 6 278 6 278 1 564 1 564
observations
Chi2 40,55 40,34 29,51 29,03
Significance 0,0001 0,0001 0,0003 0,0003
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Panel В next page presents the results of analysts’ recommendation issuing behaviour 
surrounding M&A deal announcement for target-affiliated analysts. The results are quite 
similar for target-affiliated analysts as they were for acquirer-affiliated analysts.
The positive and significant coefficient on variable AffilTarget*After suggests that target- 
affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations after the deal announcement. In addition, the 
coefficient on variable Affiljarget*Before in model 4 is negative and statistically significant at 
10% level, which confirms the results of model 3. Thus the results suggest that the odds of a 
target-affiliated analyst issuing a higher recommendation decreases when the recommendation 
is issued before the deal announcement. These results provide support for my hypothesis that 
target-affiliated analysts’ aim to enhance the deal terms for their client firm by issuing lower 
recommendations prior and higher recommendations after the deal announcement about 
acquirer’s stock. In addition, when models 3 and 4 are run on stock deal data, the coefficients 
on variables AffilTarget*After and Affilrarget*Before are in line with the coefficients on models 
run on all data. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, these 
results provide support for my hypothesis that affiliated analysts target-affiliated analysts aim 
to enhance the deal terms for their client firms by issuing lower recommendations before and 
higher recommendations after the deal announcement.
Interestingly the coefficient on Affili^get-variable is positive, even though not statistically 
significant, in model 4. The sign change suggests that the lowering effect of before-interaction 
variable is stronger than that of target-affiliation variable and that the timing of the 
recommendation has an effect on its level.
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TABLE 5.7 Panel B: Results related to the analysts’ recommendation issuing behaviour surrounding 
M&A deal announcement. Panel A presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for acquirer- 
affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The dependent variable has discrete values ranging from I to 5. 1 
represents “Strong sell” recommendation, 2 “Sell”, 3 “Hold”, 4 “Buy” and 5 “Strong buy”. Afftlrargei and AffilАщ 
are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value 1 if the recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst 
and 0 otherwise. After and Before are dummy variables for the time of the report issuance related to the M&A 
deal announcement. After variable takes on value 1 if the report has been announced after the deal 
announcement, 0 otherwise. Before variable takes on value I if the report has been issued prior the deal 
announcement, 0 otherwise. SameSic variable takes on the value 1 if the acquirer and target firms are operating 
in the same industry, 0 otherwise. Szze-variable is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MB Val is 
acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 
days prior to the acquisition and other control variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the 











































































6 278 6 278 1 564 1 564
Chi2 30,15 29,01 33,96 32,47
Significance 0,0002 0,0003 0,0001 0,0001
Table 5.8 on page 82 and 84 presents results on dynamic analysts’ recommendation revision 
behaviour surrounding the M&A deal announcement. I have divided the time periods before 
and after into quarters to be able to study the analyst behaviour surrounding the deal 
announcement more precisely. I have used two reference categories for the Quarter-dummy 
variables, -4Q and 0Q. -4Q refers to a time period 4 quarters before the M&A deal 
announcement and 0Q is the time period when the M&A deal has been announced. -4Q can 
be seen as a neutral quarter, when affiliated analysts’ recommendations are on nearly the same 
level as unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations (see figure 3) and the deviation seems to start 
later. 0Q is used as a reference category to be able to measure the difference in
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recommendations compared to the M&A deal announcement period levels. Results for control 
variables are in line with the previous models but have not been tabulated to save space. The 
quarterly deviations in analyst recommendations are studied for both all data (6 278 
recommendations) and stock deal data consisting of deals with at least 50 percent stock 
financing (1 564 recommendations). There are multicollinearity issues with the model run on 
stock data and the model can not be estimated separately for both reference categories 
mentioned above. Thus only one set of results is presented.
Panel A on page 82 presents the dynamic analysts’ recommendation behaviour related to 
acquirer-affiliation. In all data results, there are statistically significant coefficients on -3Q, 
-2Q*AffilAcq, -lQ*AffilAcq, 2Q*AffilAcq and 4Q*AffilAcq variables for the reference category 
-4Q. All statistically significant coefficients are positive. This means that relative to -4 
quarter, the odds of issuing a higher recommendation versus the combined lower categories 
increases for all the mentioned variables. For example, the highest of the reported 
coefficients, the coefficient on 2Q*AffilAcq-variable, converts to an odds ratio of 3,900. Thus 
the odds of an acquirer-affiliated analysts’ issuing a higher category recommendation 
increases by a factor of 3,900 if the recommendation is issued during quarter 2Q after the 
M&A deal announcement.
The results suggest that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations during 
quarters -2Q, -IQ and +2Q than other analysts compared to the recommendations they issued 
during quarter -4. These results are in line with my hypotheses that acquirer-affiliated analysts 
issue high level recommendations both prior and after the deal announcement.
Model 6 provides similar results for all data on reference category 0Q as well. In addition, the 
coefficients are larger for all statistically significant acquirer-affiliation related interaction 
terms compared to reference category -4Q. Contrary to reference category -4Q, also 
lQ*AffilAcq and 4Q*AffilAcq -variables have statistically significant positive coefficients. The 
results for reference category 0Q suggest that the odds of a higher level recommendation 
increase when acquirer-affiliated analysts issue the recommendation during other quarters 
than the M&A deal announcement quarter.
Results for stock deal -data have positive coefficients for all quarters without affiliation 
interaction and all but one are statistically significant. These results suggest that other than
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acquirer-affiliated analysts issue higher level recommendations during other quarters than 
quarter -4 and 0. The coefficient on AffilAcq is negative and statistically significant. This 
might result from the fact that variable -2Q*AffilAcq has been dropped of from the model and 
thus variable AffiUcq picks out its coefficient so to speak. Thus it can be assumed that the 
coefficient on -2Q*AffilAcq would be negative which would imply that the odds of acquirer- 
affiliated analysts issuing a high level recommendation decrease if the recommendation is 
issued during quarter -2Q prior the deal announcement. This result contradicts my hypotheses 
of strategic analyst behaviour and provides support for my hypothesis of affiliated analysts’ 
aim to enhance their reputation by issuing lower recommendations based on insider 
information they gamer about the deal in advance. The reputation improvement is based on 
the assumption that analysts anticipate based on historical evidence that acquirer’s stock price 
probably deteriorates after the deal announcement.
All reported affiliation interaction terms have positive coefficients which suggest that 
acquirer-affiliated analysts issue high level recommendations during other quarters than -2Q. 
Coefficients for -IQ, 2Q and 4Q are statistically significant which confirms the results of 
models run on all data that the odds of an acquirer-affiliated analyst’s recommendation being 
a higher level recommendation increases if it is issued during quarters -IQ, 2Q or 4Q. Thus 
the results on stock deal data suggest that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more high level 
recommendations compared to other analysts in my sample during quarters - IQ prior the deal 
or quarters 2Q and 4Q after the deal announcement. These results give support to my 
hypotheses of acquirer-affiliated analysts’ strategic recommendation behaviour surrounding 
stock financed deal announcements. However, the results that recommendations issued during 
quarter -2Q are lower are in line with the results presented previously in tables 5.4 and 5.7 
and give support to the hypothesis of analysts’ reputation building ambitions. In addition, it 
contradicts the selection bias hypothesis.
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TABLE 5.8 Panel A. Results related to the dynamic recommendation behaviour surrounding M&A deal 
announcement. Panel A presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel 
В for target-affiliation. The dependent variable has discrete values ranging from 1 to 5. 1 represents “Strong sell” 
recommendation, 2 “Sell", 3 “Hold”, 4 “Buy" and 5 “Strong buy”. AffilTarge, and AffilAcq are dummy variables for 
affiliation and take on value 1 if the recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Q(uarter) 
refers to a set of dummy variables and takes on value 1 if the recommendation is issued during a given quarter, 0 
otherwise. Negative Q variables refer to the time prior M&A deal announcement and positive Q variables to the 
time after deal announcement. SameSic variable takes the value 1 if the acquirer and target firms are operating in 
the same industry, 0 otherwise. S/ze-variable is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MBVal is 
acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 
days prior to the acquisition and other control variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the 
acquisition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at
1%
PANEL A All data All data > 50% Stock
Reference 4Q Reference 0Q
Variable Exp. Model Model Model
Sign 6 6 6




-3Q 0,201** -0,044 0,525***
(0,099) (0,204) (0,193)
-2Q -0,008 -0,253 0,377**
(0,097) (0,202) (0,183)




IQ 0,077 -0,168 0,363*
(0,098) (0,203) (0,189)
2Q -0,011 -0,256 0,483**
(0,100) (0,203) (0,195)
3Q 0,108 -0,137 0,492***
(0,099) (0,203) (0,187)
4Q 0,006 -0,239 0,197
(0,099) (0,203) (0,189)
-4Q*AffilAcq + 0,444 0,612
(0,549) (0,960)
-3Q*AffilAcq + -0,444 Dropped 0,129
(0,549) (0,906)
-2Q*AffilAcq + 0,916* 1,360** Dropped
(0,556) (0,554)
-lQ*AffilAcq + 0,875* 1,319*** 1,257*
(0,498) (0,496) (0,708)
lQ*AffilAcq + 0,553 0,997** 0,120
(0,476) (0,473) (0,718)
2Q*AffilAcq + 1,361*** 1,805*** 2,369***
(0,525) (0,523) (0,742)
3Q*AffilAcq + 0,619 1,063** 1,257
(0,514) (0,511) (0,809)
4Q* Affil Acq + 0,769* 1,213** 1,209**
(0,488) (0,485) (0,531)
Controls are used V V ^
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 1 564
Chi2™ 60,32 60,32 298,4
Significance 0,0001 0,0001 0,0000
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Panel В next page presents the dynamic recommendation behaviour results for target- 
affiliation. For regression run on all data, there are statistically significant coefficients for 
variables -3Q and 2Q*AffilTargei for the reference category of -4Q. The interaction term 
related to 2Q after the M&A deal announcement has a positive coefficient. These results 
suggest that if a target-affiliated analyst issues a recommendation about the acquirer’s stock 
during quarter +2Q, the odds that the recommendation is of a higher category versus the 
combined lower categories increase. In addition, all coefficients on interaction terms prior the 
deal announcement are negative but statistically insignificant. These results provide support 
for my hypotheses that target-affiliated analysts issue more probably a high level 
recommendation after the M&A deal announcement and stock exchange ratio decision which 
would improve their client firm’s gains in the M&A deal. On the other hand, this kind of 
recommendation behaviour aims to maximise the deal price when stock financing is used and 
thus the bank’s interests are maximised as well.
When reference category of OQ is used, there are only two statistically significant results. The 
coefficient on variable 2Q*AffïlTarget is positive which suggests that in relation to the deal 
announcement quarter, target-affiliated analysts issue higher level recommendations during 
quarter 2Q after the deal announcement. This result is in line with the results presented above. 
However, the statistically significant coefficient on AffilTarget-variable suggests that the 
dropped interaction term lQ*AffilTargct has a negative coefficient. This result implies that 
target-affiliated analysts issue lower recommendations during quarter IQ.
Results for stock deal data have positive coefficients for all quarters without affiliation 
interaction and all but one are statistically significant. Thus the odds that other than target- 
affiliated analysts issue higher level recommendation versus the combined lower levels 
increases. Variable -3Q*AffilTarget has a negative and statistically significant coefficient as 
well which suggests that the odds of a target-affiliated analyst to issue a high level 
recommendation decrease if the recommendation is issued during quarter -3Q prior the deal 
announcement compared to quarter -4Q. This result implies that target-affiliated analysts may 
issue lower recommendations about the acquirer before the deal has been announced and the 
stock exchange ratio decided. Coefficients on interaction terms after the deal announcement 
are positive except the coefficient on +4Q.
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TABLE 5.8 Panel B. Results related to the dynamic recommendation behaviour surrounding M&A deal 
announcement. Panel A presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel 
В for target-affiliation. The dependent variable has discrete values ranging from 1 to 5. 1 represents “Strong sell” 
recommendation, 2 “Sell”, 3 “Hold", 4 “Buy” and 5 “Strong buy". Affilrarf,el and AffilAcq are dummy variables for 
affiliation and take on value 1 if the recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Q(uarter) 
refers to a set of dummy variables and takes on value 1 if the recommendation is issued during a given quarter, 0 
otherwise. Negative Q variables refer to the time prior M&A deal announcement and positive Q variables to the 
time after deal announcement. SameSic variable takes the value 1 if the acquirer and target firms are operating in 
the same industry, 0 otherwise. Size-variable is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MB Val is 
acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 
days prior to the acquisition and other control variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the 
acquisition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 
1%
PANEL В All data All data > 50% Stock
Reference -4Q Reference OQ
Variable Exp. Model Model Model
Sign 6 6 6




-3Q 0,205** -0,036 0,595***
(0,099) (0,203) (0,199)
-2Q 0,019 -0,222 0,433**
(0,097) (0,202) (0,189)




IQ 0,104 -0,137 0,372*
(0,097) (0,202) (0,195)
2Q 0,001 -0,240 0,553***
(0,100) (0,203) (0,203)
3Q 0,112 -0,130 0,526***
(0,100) (0,203) (0,192)
4Q 0,036 -0,205 0,276
(0,100) (0,202) (0,194)
-4Q* Affiljarget ? 0,681 0,270
(0,667) (0,660)
-3Q*AffilTargM -0,646 0,035 -1,173*
(0,492) (0,658) (0,769)
-2Q*AffilTarge, -0,278 0,403 -0,461
(0,681) (0,810) (0,847)
-lQ*AffilTargc, -0,141 0,539 1,162
(0,691) (0,819) (0,878)
lQ*AffilTarget + -0,681 Dropped Dropped
(0,667)
2Q*AffilTarget + 1,218** 1,899*** 0,375
(0,528) (0,686) (0,682)
3Q*AffilTarget 0,562 1,243* 0,809
(0,563) (0,714) (0,748)
4Q*AffilTarget -0,563 0,118 -1,205
(0,625) (0,764) (0,931)
Controls used .........".........  ..........V.............“..  ................ v..........................“...........-...........4......... '.......... .
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 1 564
Chi2 50,37 50,37 56,12
Significance 0,0003 0,0003 0,0001
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5.1.3. Discussion
As a whole, for the whole data sample, my results for absolute recommendations suggest that 
acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more high level recommendations compared to other 
analysts in my sample. In addition, target-affiliated analysts seem to issue more low level 
recommendations compared to other analysts. Thus the results give support to my hypotheses 
that acquirer-affiliated analysts are overly optimistic about acquirer's stock and that acquirer- 
affiliated analysts issue more positive “Buy” and “Strong buy” and less negative “Strong sell” 
and “Sell” recommendations about the acquirer. However, these results may be due to 
selection bias as well, as discussed in section 2.3.3. Additionally, support for hypotheses that 
target-affiliated analysts issue more negative “Strong sell” and “Sell” recommendations about 
the acquirer’s stock prior the M&A deal announcement and more positive recommendations 
after the deal announcement is provided both for stock deals sample and for all deals sample. 
Hence support for target-affiliated analysts’ strategic behaviour is provided. These findings 
are in line with the ones in Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) study.
Support for hypothesis that large deal value increases the effect of affiliation is provided 
especially for target-affiliation, which is in line with the findings in Kolasinski and Kothari 
(2007) study. In addition, evidence for my hypothesis that the European regulation change in 
2003 resulted in lower recommendations is provided. Lower recommendations are issued by 
both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Interestingly, I find differing results compared to a 
study by Kadan et al. (2008) on the regulation changes in the US. Kadan et al. (2008) find that 
analyst recommendation scale has converted from five categories to three after the new 
regulations in 2003. Similar effect can not be seen in my results. In addition, the high volume 
and bull market conditions result in higher recommendations issued by at least unaffiliated 
analysts.
Evidence that stock financing affects affiliated analysts’ recommendations is also provided. 
My results suggest that in my sample of deals with at least 50% stock financing, acquirer- 
affiliated analysts issue more low level recommendations compared to my all deals sample. 
My results imply in addition, that target-affiliated analysts issue more high level 
recommendations in deals with stock financing. These findings contradict the ones in 
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) study.
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Finally, my results suggest that the recommendation issuing time and quarter have an effect 
on the recommendation level. For both all deals sample and stock financed deals sample, my 
results suggest that both acquirer- and target-affiliated analysts issue lower level 
recommendations prior and higher level recommendations after the deal announcement. 
Hence evidence for target-affiliated analysts’ strategic recommendation behaviour is 
provided. However, when model 6 is run to study the report timing quarter more precisely, 
evidence that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue lower level recommendations merely during 
quarter -2Q in stock deal sample and quarter -3Q in all deals sample is found. Coefficients on 
other acquirer-affiliation related quarters are positive which implies that the recommendations 
issued during other quarters surrounding the deal announcement are high level 
recommendations.
Nevertheless, acquirer-affiliated results are mixed. On the other hand, acquirer-affiliated 
analysts’ lower level recommendations prior the deal announcement do not provide support 
for either the strategic behaviour hypothesis or selection bias hypothesis. On the contrary, the 
results imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts may try to enhance their reputation by exploiting 
inside information about the deal and by issuing lower recommendations about the acquirer 
whose stock price they assume will deteriorate after the deal announcement. Then again, the 
higher recommendation levels issued during quarters -IQ and 2Q provide support for the 
strategic recommendation behaviour hypothesis.
5.2. Relative recommendations
5.2.1. Descriptive and summary data
Table 5.9 next page presents the minimum, mean, median and maximum relative 
recommendations according to analyst affiliation. The results presented in table 5.9 show that 
in my sample acquirer-affiliated analysts seem to be more optimistic about the acquirer’s 
stock than target-affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. The results give support for my 
hypotheses about acquirer-affiliated analysts’ optimism.
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TABLE 5.9. Minimum, median, mean and maximum relative recommendation according to 
analyst affiliation.
Affiliation Min Median Mean Max N
Target -3 0 0,023 4 153
Acquirer -3 0 0,273 5 237
Unaffiliated -4 0 0,003 5 5 889
Total 6 279











Figure 4 plots acquirer-affiliated, target-affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ relative recommendations 
for acquirer firms for the two-year period surrounding the announcement of the M&A deal. Target-and 
acquirer-affiliated analyst recommendations were not issued on quarter 0. Level zero is the neutral 
“consensus” level in figure 4. Quarters are presented in X axis and quarter 0 represents M&A deal 
announcement quarter.
Figure 4 above presents the average relative recommendations partitioned by analyst 
affiliation and quarter. The results suggest that on average, acquirer-affiliated analysts seem to 
be more optimistic about the acquirer prior the deal than target-affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts in my data sample. The optimism is concentrated on the quarters preceding the M&A 
deal announcement, especially on quarters -2Q and -IQ in figure 4. In addition, the acquirer- 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations return to the consensus level during quarters IQ and 2Q 
after the M&A deal announcement. Target-affiliated analysts seem to be issuing relatively 
more negative recommendations compared to consensus during quarters -3Q, -2Q and -IQ 
prior the M&A deal announcement. However, results presented in figure 4 imply that target- 
affiliated analysts issue more optimistic recommendations compared to unaffiliated and
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acquirer-affiliated analysts after the deal announcement during quarter +2Q. Target-affiliated 
analysts’ recommendations return to the consensus level during quarter 3Q and 4Q after the 
deal announcement.
The results presented in figure 4 give support to my hypotheses of acquirer-affiliated analysts 
issuing more positive recommendations on average compared to unaffiliated or target- 
affiliated analysts. In addition, the target-affiliated analysts’ behaviour seen in figure 4 seems 
to give support to my strategic behaviour hypotheses related to stock financed deals since 
target-affiliated analysts seem to be pessimistic related to unaffiliated and affiliated analysts 
prior the deal announcement and then clearly more optimistic during quarter +2Q after the 
announcement.
5.2.2. Regression results
Table 5.10 in the following pages presents my results related to analyst affiliation, deal value 
and reputation. Panel A presents the results related to acquirer-affiliated analysts and panel В 
the results related to target-affiliated analysts. Other results are not tabulated due to their lack 
of statistical significance. However, there are some statistically significant results also for deal 
timing and dynamic analyst behaviour related analyses, which are reported and commented 
on.
As can be seen from the table 5.10 both panels A and B, the results for affiliation, deal value 
and reputation on relative recommendations seem to have poor statistical significance. The 
only statistically significant coefficient is on AffiUcq* Deal Val in model 2, not considering the 
control variables. Interestingly there is a negative coefficient reported on AffilAcq in model 2 
contrary to other models in table xx and thus it seems that the AffilACq*DealVal -variable has 
a stronger effect than the mere acquirer-affiliation on relative recommendations in model 2. 
The coefficient on AffilAcq* Deal Val -variable converts to an odds ratio of 1,12, which means 
that given a one unit increase in AffilAcq*DealVal, the odds of issuing a more optimistic 
recommendation compared to the lower categories (more pessimistic or the same level) 
increases by 1,12. Thus the results suggest that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more 
optimistic recommendations if the deal value is large compared to deals where the deal value 
is smaller. Thus these results provide support for my hypotheses that affiliated analysts’ bias 
might increase when the deal value increases. However, the model significance is poor 
(0,422) and thus the result is not very reliable.
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Regressions are run on Topl5 explanatory variable as well, but the results are statistically 
insignificant and thus are not tabulated here. Regressions are run on Hostile explanatory 
variable as well to see if the affiliated analysts’ behaviour is different in hostile deals. The 
results are insignificant and are not tabulated.
TABLE 5.10 Panel A. Results related to affiliation, deal value and reputation. Panel A presents the 
estimated coefficients and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The 
dependent variable relative recommendation has values -I (more pessimistic), +l(more optimistic), 0 (no 
difference). Affil Targel and Affilare dummy variables for target- and acquirer-affiliation and take on value 1 if 
the recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Ра/ие-variable is the natural logarithm of 
the deal value, Top 15 dummy variable is used as a proxy of both analyst and bank reputation and takes on value 
1 if the analyst is working for one of the 15 largest market share banks, 0 otherwise. Stock variables takes on 
value I if the deal was 50% stock financed, 0 otherwise. SameSic variable takes the value 1 if the acquirer and 
target firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. Size-variable is the natural logarithm of the 
acquirer’s market value. MBVal is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. 
Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other control variables are measured as 
previous financial year end prior to the acquisition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, 
** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
PANEL A
Variable Exp. Model Model Model
Sign 1 2 5
AffiAcq + 0,081 -0,546 0,080
(0,125) (0,418) (0,146)








SameSic ? 0,068 0,072 0,076
(0,051) (0,051) (0,051)
Size -0,032** -0,033*** -0,034***
(0,013) (0,012) (0,013)
MBVal -0,013 -0,013 -0,013
(0,012) (0,012) (0,012)
Debt 0,001 0,001 0,001
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 6 278
Chi2 13,06 15,42 10,83
Significance 0,5215 0,4218 0,2113
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TABLE 5.10 Panel B. Results related to affiliation, deal value and reputation. Panel A presents the 
estimated coefficients and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The 
dependent variable relative recommendation has values -1 (more pessimistic), +l(more optimistic), 0 (no 
difference). AffilTarget and AffilAc4 are dummy variables for target- and acquirer-affiliation and take on value 1 if 
the recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Fa/z/e-variable is the natural logarithm of 
the deal value, Topi5 dummy variable is used as a proxy of both analyst and bank reputation and takes on value 
1 if the analyst is working for one of the 15 largest market share banks, 0 otherwise. Stock variables takes on 
value 1 if the deal was 50% stock financed, 0 otherwise. SameSic variable takes the value 1 if the acquirer and 
target firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. Size-variable is the natural logarithm of the 
acquirer’s market value. MB Val is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. 
Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other control variables are measured as 
previous financial year end prior to the acquisition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, 










AffilTarget - -0,089 -0,089 -0,136
(0,149) (0,149) (0,192)





Affil Target* Stock ? 0,143
(0,301)
SameSic ? 0,069 0,069 0,075
(0,051) (0,051) (0,051)
Size -0,033*** 0,002*** -0,034***
(0,012) (0,012) (0,013)
MBVal -0,013 -0,013 -0,013
(0,012) (0,012) (0,012)
Debt 0,001 0,001 0,001
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 6 278
.ch?"................................... 12,94 12,94 10,93
Significance 0,531 0,531 0,2055
Deal timing related results are not tabulated here due to their lack of statistical significance. 
The results for models 7 and 10 are statistically insignificant for both affiliation variables and 
Top 15 variable. The situation is mostly the same for models 8 and 11, even though variables 
AffilAcq and AffilAcq*HighVol in model 11 have statistically significant coefficients, 0,378 
(0,226) and -0,443 (0,269) respectively, standard errors are in parenthesis. Both are 
significant at 10% level. Thus the results suggest that acquirer-affiliated recommendations 
issued during high M&A volume markets tend to more pessimistic compared to the consensus 
recommendations than acquirer-affiliated recommendations issued during low M&A volume. 
However, the model significance is merely 0,0822 and thus these results are not very reliable. 
The regression models are run for variable Top 15 as well, but the results were insignificant 
and are not tabulated here. Regressions are run on Hostile explanatory variable as well to see
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if the affiliated analysts’ behaviour is different in hostile deals. The results are insignificant 
and are not tabulated.
However, in model 12, variable RegChange has statistically significant values both in target- 
affiliation and Topl5 banks related regressions. The coefficients on target-affiliated related 
model are for RegChange -0,082, significant at 5% level, standard error being 0,050, and for 
Affilrarget*RegChange-variable 0,283 (not statistically significant). The coefficients for Topi 5 
related regression model are -0,130, significant at 10% level, standard error being 0,058 for 
Topi 5-variable and for Topl5*RegChange-varible -0,074 (not statistically significant). Thus 
the results suggest that recommendations issued after the regulation change by other than 
target-affiliated (target-affiliation related model) or non-Topl5 bank employed analysts 
(Top 15 related model) are less optimistic compared to the consensus than recommendations 
issued prior to the regulation changes. However, the model significance is merely 0,0471 and 
thus these results are not very reliable.
Results related to the dynamic analyst behaviour surrounding M&A deal announcement are 
mostly statistically insignificant and are not tabulated here. However, in Model 3, variable 
Top 15*After is statistically significant at 10% level. It has a coefficient of 0,174 and standard 
deviation of 0,103. The coefficient 0,174 converts into an odds ratio of 1,19 which means that 
for a one unit increase in Topl5*After the odds of issuing a more optimistic recommendation 
compared to the consensus recommendation versus the lower categories are 1,19 greater. 
However, the model significance is 0,123 and thus the result is nor very reliable. In addition, 
-IQ * AffiUcq has a significant coefficient in model 6 for acquirer-affiliation. The coefficient 
is 0,831, standard error 0,489 and significance is 10% level. This result suggests that acquirer- 
affiliated analysts issue more optimistic recommendations compared to the consensus versus 
other analysts in my study, which gives support to my hypothesis of acquirer-affiliation 
resulting in overly optimistic recommendations prior the deal announcement. However, the 
model significance is again very poor (0,511) and thus the results are not reliable.
92
5.3. Recommendation revisions
5.3.1. Descriptive and summary data
Table 5.11 below presents the minimum, mean, median and maximum recommendation 
revisions by analyst affiliation. The results presented in table 5.11 suggest that in my sample, 
unaffiliated analysts have the highest positive revision and thus upgrade the acquirer stock the 
most. This might be due to the fact that affiliated analysts’ revisions are partitioned to 
different quarters surrounding the M&A deal announcement (see figure 5) and this dynamic 
pattem can not be seen in table 5.11.
TABLE 5.11. The minimum, median, mean and maximum recommendation revision according 
to analyst affiliation.
Affiliation Min Median Mean Max N
Target -4 1 0,508 5 153
Acquirer -4 1 0,734 5 237
Unaffiliated -4 1 0,763 5 5 889
Total 6 279
FIGURE 5 Analyst average recommendation revisions about acquirer firms by quarter.
■Target-affiliated ■ Acquirer-affiliated Unaffiliated
Figure 5 plots acquirer-affiliated, target-affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendation revisions 
for acquirer firms for the two-year period surrounding the announcement of the M&A deal. Target-and 
acquirer-affiliated analyst recommendations were not issued on quarter 0. Positive values in figure 5 
are recommendation upgrades and negative values downgrades. Quarters are presented in X axis and 
quarter 0 represents M&A deal announcement quarter.
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Figure 5 in the previous page presents average recommendation revision partitioned by 
affiliation and quarters surrounding the M&A deal announcement. The largest upgrades in the 
figure 5 are done by unaffiliated analysts during quarter 0. Results presented in figure 5 imply 
that the second largest upgrades are done by target-affiliated analysts during quarter +1Q after 
the deal announcement. In addition, results in figure 5 imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts 
have upgraded acquirer’s stock more than unafifiliated and target-affiliated analysts during 
quarter -2Q prior the deal announcement and quarter +2Q after the announcement. Results in 
figure 5 imply in addition that target-affiliated analysts have upgraded acquirer’s stock more 
than unaffiliated and acquirer-affiliated analysts during quarter -3Q prior the M&A deal 
announcement and +1Q after the announcement. However, target-affiliated analysts seem to 
have downgraded acquirer’s stock during quarter 3Q after the announcement. In addition, 
target-affiliated analyst have upgraded acquirer’s stock less than acquirer-affiliated and 
unafifiliated analysts during quarters -4Q , -2Q and -IQ prior the announcement.
The results presented in figure 5 imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts’ revisions deviate from 
unafifiliated analysts’ revisions mostly during quarters -2Q before the deal announcement and 
+1Q and +2Q after the announcement. These results suggest that acquirer-affiliated analysts 
upgrade acquirer stock more than unaffiliated prior and after the deal announcement and seem 
to give support to my hypothesis of acquirer-affiliated analysts upgrading the acquirer more 
than unaffiliated analysts prior and after the deal announcement. In addition, results in figure 
5 imply that target-affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer’s stock less than unafifiliated analysts 
prior to the deal announcement and after the announcement in quarters +3Q and +4Q. 
Additionally, figure 5 gives some support to my hypotheses related target-affiliated analysts’ 
strategic behaviour in stock financed deals since target-affiliated analysts seem to upgrade 
acquirer’s stock more than the unafifiliated analysts right after the deal announcement.
5.3.2. Regression results
Table 5.12 presents my results related to analyst affiliation, deal value and reputation. Panel A 
presents the results related to acquirer-affiliation and panel В the results related to target- 
affiliation. The results for deal timing are not tabulated here due to their low significance.
As can be seen from both of the panels in table 5.12 in the following pages, results for 
recommendation revisions on affiliation, deal value and stock related variables are mostly
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statistically insignificant. However, the coefficient on AffiUcq in model 1 has the same sign as 
the coefficients for absolute recommendation levels. In models 2 and 5, the coefficients on 
AffiUcq are negative. The negative sign on AffiUcq in model 5 may be explained by the 
statistically significant positive coefficient on AffiUcq*Stock. The positive coefficient on 
AffiUcq*Stock-variable converts to an odds ratio of 2,10 which means that for a one unit 
increase in the AffiUcq * Stock-variable, the odds of an higher recommendation revision, i.e. an 
upgrade versus the combined lower categories (lower revision and the same revision) is 2,10 
times grater. These results suggest that stock financing has an effect on acquirer-affiliated 
analysts’ recommendation revisions. In addition, the results imply that acquirer-affiliated 
analysts’ recommendation upgrade is more probable if the deal is financed with at least 50 
percent with stock compared to deals with less or no stock financing. The coefficient sign 
change in model 2 for deal value implies similar effect for large deal values even though it is 
not statistically significant.
Regressions are run on Topi5 explanatory variable as well, but the results are statistically 
insignificant and thus are not tabulated here. Regressions are run on Hostile explanatory 
variable as well to see if the affiliated analysts’ behaviour is different in hostile deals. The 
results are insignificant and are not tabulated.
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TABLE 5.12 Panel A. Results related to affiliation, deal value and reputation. Panel A presents the 
estimated coefficients and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The 
dependent variable recommendation revision has discrete values -I (downgrade), +1 (upgrade), 0 (no change). 
AffilTarg" and AffilAcq are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value I if the recommendation is given by 
an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Ра/ие-variable is the natural logarithm of the deal value. Stock variable 
takes on value 1 if the deal was 50% stock financed, 0 otherwise. SameSic variable takes the value I if the 
acquirer and target firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. S/ze-variable is the natural logarithm of 
the acquirer’s market value. MBVal is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. 
Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other control variables are measured as 
previous financial year end prior to the acquisition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, 
** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
PANEL A
Variable Exp. Model Model Model
Sign 1 2 5
AffiAcq 0,044 -0,333 -0,123
(0,137) (0,455) (0,153)








SameSic ? 0,009 0,012 -0,001
(0,057) (0,057) (0,057)
Size 0,012 0,011 0,014)
(0,014) (0,014)
MBVal -0,015 -0,016 -0,014
(0,014) (0,014) (0,014)
Debt 0,006*** 0,006*** 0,006***
(0,002) (0,002) (0,002)
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 6 278
Chir 22,71 23,48 20,04
Significance 0,0651 0,0745 0,0102
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TABLE 5.12 Panel B. Results related to affiliation, deal value and reputation. Panel A presents the 
estimated coefficients and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel В for target-affiliation. The 
dependent variable recommendation revision has discrete values -1 (downgrade), +1 (upgrade), 0 (no change). 
Affiliarge, and AffilAcq are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value 1 if the recommendation is given by 
an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Ка/ие-variable is the natural logarithm of the deal value. Stock variable 
takes on value 1 if the deal was 50% stock financed, 0 otherwise. SameSic variable takes the value 1 if the 
acquirer and target firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. Size-variable is the natural logarithm of 
the acquirer’s market value. MBVal is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. 
Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other control variables are measured as 
previous financial year end prior to the acquisition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, 
** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
PANEL В
Variable Exp. Model Model Model
Sign 1 2 5
Affilf arget -0,073 -0,300 -0,085
(0,167) (0,621) (0,209)






Affi Ijarget* Stock ? 0,029
(0,349)
SameSic ? 0,009 0,011 0,003
(0,057) (0,057) (0,057)
Size 0,011 0,011 0,013
(0,014) (0,014) (0,014)
MBVal -0,016 -0,016 -0,014
(0,014) (0,014) (0,014)
Debt 0,006* 0,006*** 0,006***
(0,278) (0,002) (0,002)
Number of observations 6 278 6 278 6 278
Chi2 22,82 22,94 15,34
Significance 0,0633 0,0854 0,0528
Deal timing related results for model 7 are statistically insignificant for both affiliation and 
Top 15 related models and are not tabulated here. Also results for models 8 and 11 on high 
M&A volume periods are statistically insignificant and not tabulated here. The same applies 
for models 9 and 12 on regulation change. However, there are statistically significant results 
for model 10 which is related to bull market periods. The coefficient on variable Bull is 
statistically significant for both target- and acquirer-affiliation related regressions, but not for 
Top 15 related model. The results for Bull-variable are 0,109 (0,063) significant at 10 % level 
for acquirer-affiliation related regression and 0,110 (0,063) significant at 10 % level for 
target-affiliation related regression and thus are nearly the same. Coefficient 0,110 converts to 
an odds ratio of 1,12 which implies that the odds of a recommendation upgrade are 1,12 times 
grater for recommendations issued during bull markets than for recommendations issued 
during other times by other than affiliated analysts. The coefficients on AffilACq*Bull,
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AffilTarget*Bull and Topl5*Bull are negative but statistically insignificant. However, the 
results imply that unaffiHated analysts hired by less reputable banks issue higher revisions 
than affiliated and Top 15 banks hired analysts during bullish market conditions. These results 
are not in line with my hypothesis that affiliated analysts issue more optimistic 
recommendations during stock market upturns. However, the results provide support for my 
hypothesis that Topi 5 banks employed analysts issue lower recommendations.
Tables 5.13 and 5.14 in the following pages present results on dynamic analysts’ 
recommendation revision behaviour surrounding the M&A deal announcement. Only 
acquirer-affiliation related results on stock deal data are tabulated for models 3 and 4 since 
other results are not statistically significant. However, the coefficient signs for target- 
affiliation are in line with the results reported in section 5.1.2. Results for model 6 are 
presented for both all deals data sample and stock financed deals sample. Here the deal is 
considered as stock financed if any stock is used as a form of payment in the deal. This differs 
from the definition of a stock financed deal used in section 5.1.2. due to the fact that in order 
to avoid problems with multicollinearity, the sample size needs to be increased. This results in 
3 152 stock deals in my sample.
Table 5.13 next page presents the acquirer-affiliation related results for models 3 and 4. 
Model 3 has statistically significant and positive coefficient on variable AffilAcq*After which 
implies that the odds that an acquirer-affiliated analyst issues an upgrade after the deal 
announcement are higher than if the recommendation is issued prior the deal announcement. 
The result is confirmed by the statistically significant negative coefficient on variable 
AffiUcq* Before. These results imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue lower 
recommendation revisions prior stock financed deals and higher revisions after the deal 
announcement. The results are not in line with my strategic analyst recommendation 
behaviour or with the selection bias hypothesis. In contrast, the results imply that acquirer- 
affiliated analysts might aim to enhance their reputation by downgrading acquirer’s stock 
prior the deal announcement.
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TABLE 5.13 Panel A: Results related to the analysts’ recommendation issuing behaviour surrounding 
M&A deal announcement. Panel A presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for acquirer- 
affiliation. The dependent variable recommendation revision has discrete values -1 (downgrade), +1 (upgrade), 0 
(no change), ffiljarget and AffilAcq are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value 1 if the recommendation is 
given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. After and Before are dummy variables for the time of the report 
issuance related to the M&A deal announcement. After variable takes on value 1 if the report has been 
announced after the deal announcement, 0 otherwise. Before variable takes on value 1 if the report has been 
issued prior the deal announcement, 0 otherwise. SameSic variable takes on the value 1 if the acquirer and target 
firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. Size-variable is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s 
market value. MBVal is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market 
value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other control variables are measured as previous financial 
year end prior to the acquisition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at
5%, *** Significant at 1%
PANEL A
Variable
Any Stock Any Stock
Exp. Model Model
Sign 3 4








AffilAcq* Before + oP Í a
*
1








Number of observations 3 152 3 152
Chi2 22,93 23,53
Significance 0,0034 0,0027
Table 5.14 on page 101 presents results on model 6 on dynamic analysts’ recommendation 
revision behaviour surrounding the M&A deal announcement. I have divided the time periods 
before and after into quarters to be able to study the analyst behaviour surrounding the deal 
announcement more precisely. I have used two reference categories for the Quarter-dummy 
variables, -4Q and 0Q as in section 5.1.2. Results for control variables are in line with the 
previous models but have not been tabulated to save space. The quarterly deviations in analyst 
recommendations are studied for both all data (6 278 recommendations) and stock deal data 
consisting of deals with any stock financing (3 152 recommendations). There are 
multicollinearity issues with the model run on stock data and the model can not be estimated 
separately for both reference categories mentioned above. Thus only one set of results is
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presented. In addition, the model had to be run separately for quarters before and after the 
M&A deal announcement for target-affiliation.
Panel A presents the results for acquirer-affiliation. For all deals sample, variables -3Q, OQ 
and 2Q*AffilAcq have statistically significant positive coefficients when -4Q is used as the 
reference category. These results suggest that relative to -4Q, other than acquirer-affiliated 
analysts seem to upgrade acquirer’s stock during quarters -3Q and OQ. Contrary to this, 
acquirer-affiliated analysts seem to upgrade acquirer’s stock during quarter 2Q after the deal 
announcement. The coefficient 1,080 on 2Q*AffilAcq-variable converts into an odds ratio of 
2,944 which means that the odds of an acquirer-affiliated analysts upgrading acquirer’s stock 
is 2,944 times greater during quarter 2Q compared to the revisions they issue during other 
quarters and to the revisions issued by other analysts during quarter 2Q. These results give 
support for my hypothesis that acquirer-affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer’s stock after the 
M&A deal announcement.
Reference category OQ results in more statistically significant results for all deals data sample 
as can be seen from table 5.14 panel A next page. -4Q, -2Q, -IQ, IQ, 2Q and 4Q are 
statistically significant and negative. Thus the recommendation revisions issued by other than 
acquirer-affiliated analysts during those quarters are more probably downgrades than the 
revisions issued during quarter 0. This implies that there are upgrades during the quarter when 
M&A deal is announced. In addition, results for variables -2Q*AffilAcq and 2Q*AffilAcq are 
statistically significant and both coefficients are positive. These results suggest that acquirer- 
affiliated analysts seem to upgrade acquirer’s stock during quarters -2Q and 2Q compared to 
other quarters. Again, these results give support to my hypothesis of acquirer-affiliated 
analysts upgrading acquirer’s stock more than the consensus after the deal has been 
announced.
In addition, the statistically significant positive coefficient on -2Q*AffilAcq suggests that 
acquirer-affiliated analysts would upgrade acquirer’s stock prior to the deal announcement. 
This might be reasonable especially in stock financed deals. Acquirer-affiliated analysts can 
aid in improving the deal conditions for an acquirer-client if the stock price can be raised up 
prior the stock exchange ratio has been decided. This would lead to the payment consisting of 
smaller number shares and the exchange ratio would thus be more beneficial to the acquirer- 
client. In cash deals, the upgrading of acquirer’s stock could be seen as a form of general
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optimism of the acquirer-affiliated analysts about the acquirer, and thus the result would give 
support to my hypotheses of acquirer-affiliated analysts being overly optimistic about client 
firm stock.
Results for acquirer-affiliation on deals with any stock financing are in line with the results 
presented above. The coefficients on variables lQ*AffilACq and 2Q*AffilACq are positive and 
statistically significant which suggests that acquirer-affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer’s 
stock after a stock financed deal is announced. In addition, the coefficient for -2Q*AffilACq is 
positive but statistically insignificant. These results differ from the results for models 3 and 4 
presented in table 5.13 in page 98. However, the negative coefficient on AffilAcq-variable 
picks up the coefficient of the dropped variable AffilACq*-3Q and is negative, although not 
statistically significant. This result implies that the negative coefficient on variable 
AffilAcq*Before might be caused by acquirer-affiliated analysts’ downgrades during quarter 
-3Q.
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TABLE 5.14 Panel A. Results related to the dynamic recommendation behaviour surrounding M&A deal 
announcement Panel A presents the estimated coefficient and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel 
В for target-affiliation. The dependent variable recommendation revision has discrete values -1 (downgrade), +1 
(upgrade), 0 (no change). Affillar%e, and AffilAcq are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value 1 if the 
recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Q(uarter) refers to a set of dummy variables 
and takes on value 1 if the recommendation is issued during a given quarter, 0 otherwise. SameSic variable takes 
the value 1 if the acquirer and target firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. S/ze-variable is the 
natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MBVal is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s 
debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other control 
variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the acquisition. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
PANEL A All data All data Any stock
Reference -4Q Reference OQ
Variable Exp. Model Model Model
Sign 6 6 6




-3Q 0,179* -0,301 0,635***
(0,113) (0,277) (0,165)
-2Q -0,032 -0,513* 0,417***
(0,110) (0,276) (0,158)




10 -0,002 -0,483* 0,304**
(0,108) (0,275) (0,155)
2Q -0,023 -0,504* 0,114
(0,110) (0,275) (0,156)
30 0,072 -0,409 0,318**
(0,111) (0,276) (0,158)
40 0,028 -0,453* 0,242
(0,111) (0,276) (0,159)
-4Q*AffilAcq ? Dropped 0,260 0,571
(0,610) (1,036)
-3Q*AffilAcq + -0,260 Dropped Dropped
(0,610)
-2Q*AffilAcq + 0,903 1,162* 0,256
(0,651) (0,642) (1,086)
-IQ* Affil Acq + 0,031 0,291 0,391
(0,563) (0,552) (0,933)
IQ* Affil Acq + 0,425 0,685 2,254**
(0,556) (0,546) (1,090)
2Q*AffilAcq + 1,080* 1,340** 1,820*
(0,619) (0,609) (1,013)
3Q*AffilAcq + -0,151 0,109 -0,107
(0,579) (0,569) (1,002)
4Q*AffilAcq + -0,132 0,128 0,492
(0,560) (0,550) (0,962)
Controls used .....—.— V. . . . . . . . . . 7 7
Number of
observations
6 278 6 278 3 152
Chi2 32,59 32,59 50,51
Significance 0,051 0,051 0,0003
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Panel B presents the results for target-affiliation. For all deals sample and reference category 
-4Q, variables 0Q, lQ*AffilTarget and 2Q* AffilTarget are statistically significant. The positive 
coefficient on 0Q suggests that relative to -4Q, other than target-affiliated analysts seem to 
upgrade acquirer’s stock during quarter 0Q which is in line with the results related to 
acquirer-affiliation and presented in panel A. The coefficients on both significant target- 
affiliated quarter variables are positive. Thus the results suggest that target-affiliated analysts 
upgrade acquirer’s stock during quarters IQ and 2Q after the deal announcement relative to 
-4Q. The coefficients convert to odds ratios of 4,402 and 2,737 for quarters 1 and 2 
respectively. This means that the odds of issuing an upgrade is 4,402 times and 2,737 times 
grater if the analyst issuing the revision is a target-affiliated analyst and the revision is issued 
during quarter 1Q or 2Q respectively. These results give support to my hypothesis that target- 
affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer's stock after the M&A deal has been announced more 
than prior the announcement. However, the model significance is poor for both all deals 
sample and stock deal data and thus the results are not very reliable.
For all deals sample and reference category 0Q, there are more statistically significant 
quarters without affiliation as can be seen from table 5.14 panel В next page. Coefficients on 
all quarters without target-affiliation relationship are negative and thus the results suggest that 
the odds that a revision is an upgrade decrease if the revision is issued during other quarters 
than the M&A deal announcement quarter by other than target-affiliated analyst. This implies 
that there are upgrades during quarter 0Q which confirms the results of acquirer-affiliation 
related models. There are no statistically significant results for target-affiliated analysts when 
the reference category is 0Q. However, the coefficients are in line with the results for 
reference category -4Q. However, the model significance is poor for both all deals sample and 
stock deal data and thus the results are not very reliable.
For any stock deals sample and quarters before the deal announcement, there are no 
statistically significant coefficients on target-affiliation. However, all coefficients are positive 
which would imply that target-affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer’s stock prior the deal 
announcement. For quarters after the deal announcement, a negative coefficient for 
3Q*AffilTarget is statistically significant which would imply that target-affiliated analysts 
downgrade acquirer’s stock during quarter 3 after the deal announcement. These results 
contradict my hypotheses of strategic analyst behaviour. However, the model significance is 
poor and thus the results are not very reliable.
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TABLE 5.14 Panel B. Results related to the dynamic recommendation behaviour surrounding IM&A deal 
announcement Panel A presents the estimated coefficient and standard errors for acquirer-affiliation and Panel 
В for target-affiliation. The dependent variable recommendation revision has discrete values -1 (downgrade), +1 
(upgrade), 0 (no change). Affil^i and AffilAcq are dummy variables for affiliation and take on value 1 if the 
recommendation is given by an affiliated analyst and 0 otherwise. Q(uarter) refers to a set of dummy variables 
and takes on value I if the recommendation is issued during a given quarter, 0 otherwise. SameSic variable takes 
the value 1 if the acquirer and target firms are operating in the same industry, 0 otherwise. S/ze-variable is the 
natural logarithm of the acquirer’s market value. MBVal is acquirer’s market-to-book ratio. Debt is acquirer’s 
debt to assets ratio. Acquirer market value is measured 14 days prior to the acquisition and other control 
variables are measured as previous financial year end prior to the acquisition. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%
PANEL В All data All data Any stock Any stock
Reference -4Q Reference 0Q Before After
Variable Exp. Model Model Model Model
Sign 6 6 6 6
-0,657 -0,1558 -0,295 0,002
(0,410) (0,703) (0,280) (0,266)
-4Q -0,461*
(0,278)
-3Q 0,138 -0,323 0,393***
(0,113) (0,277) (0,124)
-2Q -0,035 -0,496* 0,171
(0,110) (0,276) (0,132)




IQ -0,026 -0,487* reference
(0,108) (0,275)
2Q -0,022 -0,483* -0,158
(0,110) (0,275) (0,111)
3Q 0,058 -0,403 0,024
(0,111) (0,276) (0,114)
4Q -0,005 -0,466* -0,065
(0,111) (0,276) (0,115)
-4Q*AffilTlrgct ? -0,501 reference
(0,813)
-3Q*AffilT,rgci - 0,909 0,407 0,248
(0,620) (0,843) (0,678)
-2Q*AflfilTirgct - 0,714 0,213 0,581
(0,615) (0,839) (0,658)
-lQ*AflfilT,rgci - 0,489 -0,012 0,063
(0,637) (0,855) (0,686)
lQ*AflfllT,rgct + 1,482** 0,981
(0,707) (0,910)
2Q*AfifilT«rgct + 1,007* 0,506 0,101
(0,621) (0.844) (0,657)
3Q*AffilT„gC, - -0,142 -0,644 -1,422**
(0,623) (0,845) (0,726)
4Q*AffilTlrgci - 0,501 Dropped -0,389
(0,813) (0.951)
Controls used V V V
Number of 6 278 6 278 3 152 3 152
observations
Chi2 31,00 31,00 34,26 25,33
Significance 0,0736 0,0736 0,0011 0,0209
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S. 3.3. Discussion
The most meaningful factors for the analysis on recommendation revisions seem to be the 
interaction terms between the analyst affiliation and report timing in relation to the M&A deal 
announcement, especially for acquirer-affiliation. The results for the acquirer-affiliated 
analysts’ behaviour prior the M&A deal announcement are mixed as was the case for absolute 
recommendation levels. Contrary to my strategic recommendation behaviour hypotheses, 
results for models 3 and 4 imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts downgrade acquirer’s stock 
prior the M&A deal announcement. This result suggests that acquirer-affiliated analysts may 
aim to enhance their reputation by exploiting the insider information about the deal.
However, the results for stock deal data for model 6 imply that the acquirer-affiliated 
analysts’ downgrades might be timed to quarters -3Q and +3Q, other quarters having positive 
coefficients. The results imply that selection bias is not at play. In addition, coefficient on 
stock-variable in model 5 for acquirer-affiliation is positive and statistically significant, which 
suggests that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue upgrades about their client firm’s stock in stock 
deals. Nevertheless, evidence for my hypotheses that acquirer-affiliated analysts upgrade 
acquirer’s stock after the deal announcement is provided both for stock financed deals and for 
all deals sample. In addition, my results imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts upgrade 
acquirer’s stock both in all deals sample and in any stock sample during quarters IQ and 2Q.
Results for target-affiliation are more modest. The downgrade during quarter 3Q implied by 
figure 5 is recognised in the statistical analyses, other results are statistically insignificant. 
Additionally, support for my strategic recommendation behaviour hypotheses is not provided.
In addition to the results considering acquirer-affiliation, the most interesting result in this 
section is the upgrades issued by other than affiliated analysts during the M&A announcement 
quarter. Table 5.15 next page summarises the main results for my hypotheses. In addition, it 
presents the models used to study the hypotheses.
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TABLE 5.15. Main results. Table 5.15 presents my main results, hypotheses and models used to
study them.
Hypotheses Model Results
HI Affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer- 
client’s stock after the deal has been 
announced
3,6 Supporting evidence for both recommendations and
revisions and both for stock deals and all deals 
sample.
H2 Acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more 
high level (“Strong buy" and “Buy”) 
recommendations about acquirer’s 
stock than other analysts
1 Supporting evidence for recommendations in all
deals sample.
H3 Acquirer-affiliated analysts issue less 
negative (“Sell” and “Strong sell") 
recommendations than other analysts
1 Supporting evidence for recommendations in all
deals sample.
H4 Target-affiliated analysts are 
pessimistic about the acquirer and issue 
lower level recommendations about 
acquirer’s stock
1 Supporting evidence for recommendations in all 
deals sample
H5 Analysts hired by the top 15 largest 
banks issue less optimistic research
1 No evidence provided.
H6 In stock-deals, target-affiliated analysts 
issue lower recommendations or 
downgrade acquirer’s stock before the 
deal has been announced and the 
exchange ratio set
4,5,6 Supporting evidence for recommendations in stock 
deals data and for revisions in all deals data.
H7 In stock-deals, target-affiliated analysts 
issue higher recommendations or 
upgrade acquirer’s stock after the deal 
has been announced and the exchange 
ratio set
3,5,6 Supporting evidence for recommendations in stock 
deals data and for revisions in all deals data.
H8 In stock deals, acquirer-affiliated 
analysts issue higher recommendations 
or upgrade the acquirer’s stock before 
the exchange ratio has been decided
4,5,6 Mixed evidence. Quarter analysis suggests that 
higher recommendations / upgrades are issued 
during all other quarters than -2Q and -3Q in all 
deals sample.
H9 Affiliated analysts downgrade 
acquirer’s stock before the 
announcement of a stock financed deal
4,5,6 Mixed evidence. Quarter analysis suggests that 
lower recommendations / downgrades are issued 
during quarters -2Q and -3Q by both acquirer- and 
target-affiliated analysts in all deals sample.
HÍ0 Bias in affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations is larger when deal 
value is large
2 Supporting evidence especially for target-affiliation 
for recommendations in all deals data.
Hll Target-affiliated analysts upgrade 
acquirer stock after a hostile deal is 
announced
1 No evidence provided for either all deals sample or
stock deal data.
HÏ2 Investment bank employed analysts 
issue more high recommendations 
during high M&A volume years (2000 
and 2004-2006 in my sample)
8,11 Supporting evidence that at least other than 
affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations in 
all deals sample. Positive but insignificant 
coefficients also for acquirer-affiliated analysts.
H 13 Affiliated analysts issue overly
optimistic recommendations during 
stock market upturns ( 1996-2000 and 
2003-2006 in my sample)
7,10 Supporting evidence that at least other than
affiliated analysts issue higher recommendations in 
all deals sample. Positive but insignificant 
coefficients also for acquirer-affiliated analysts.
H14 Affiliated analysts issue more negative 
(“Sell” and “Strong sell”) 
recommendations after year 2003
9,12 Supporting evidence for recommendations in all 
deals sample. In addition, evidence that unaffiliated 
analysts issue lower recommendations after year
2003 is provided.
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6. Summary and conclusions
6.1. Summary
This thesis examines the conflicts of interest in merger and acquisition situations. The 
conflicts of interest are assumed to rise from investment bank advisor relationship between a 
company participating in an M&A deal and the bank acting as an advisor. The conflicts of 
interest are assumed to be realised in affiliated analysts’ recommendations. Analysts are 
considered as affiliated analysts if they are employed either by the target’s or acquirer’s 
advisor bank and issue recommendations surrounding the M&A deal announcement. Both 
acquirer- and target-affiliation are considered separately. The study was inspired by the small 
amount of studies done on M&A deals and analyst affiliation setting.
My research objectives were to find out what kinds of conflicts of interest are present in 
M&A deal situations and how are these potential conflicts of interest manifested in affiliated 
analysts’ recommendations. In addition, I studied whether the form of payment, deal timing, 
deal value and analysts’ report timing related variables have an effect on the 
recommendations issued by affiliated analysts. Additionally I examined the effects of the 
European regulation change on affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations.
My merger and acquisition data consisted of 814 deals and resulted in 6 278 
recommendations about the acquirer’s stock. There were no recommendations about the target 
companies available. Recommendations were collected form JCF database for institutional 
investors and the affiliation relationship was matched by hand with the M&A data collected 
from SDC Platinum database. There were 236 acquirer-affiliated and 153 target-affiliated 
recommendations in my sample. 36 percent of target-affiliated and 22 percent of acquirer- 
affiliated recommendations are issued surrounding stock financed deals in my sample when 
the deal is considered as stock deal if it has at least 50 percent of stock financing. In my 
sample, analysts issue recommendations according to a five categories scale.
I performed my ordered regression analysis on three dependent variables; absolute 
recommendation levels, relative recommendations and recommendation revisions. I was able 
to find statistically significant results for absolute recommendation levels and
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recommendation revisions even though my main results are related to the absolute 
recommendation levels.
6.2. Main results and discussion
Based on the literature review, I conclude that the conflicts of interest may be formed between 
the investment bank and its client firm (both acquirer- and target-clients), and, when the 
interests of client-firm and the bank are congruent, between them and investors. In addition, 
matching bank -client-firm interests may conflict with bank-employed analyst’s interests, if 
the analyst aims to maximise personal reputation by exploiting insider information.
My findings indicate that the affiliated analysts’ recommendations about the acquirer's stock 
are affected by a number of factors. For all deals sample, my results for absolute 
recommendation levels suggest that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more high level 
recommendations and that target-affiliated analysts issue more low level recommendations 
compared to other analysts in my sample. Thus the results imply that acquirer-affiliated 
analysts are overly optimistic about acquirer’s stock. However, these results might also be due 
to selection bias since in stock deals acquirer-advisor seeks a high valuation of the acquirer’s 
stock. Hence acquirer’s advisor might more probably hire an analyst that is bullish about the 
acquirer. Additionally, support for hypotheses that target-affiliated analysts issue more 
negative “Strong sell” and “Sell” recommendations about the acquirer’s stock prior the M&A 
deal announcement and more positive recommendations after the deal announcement is 
provided both for stock deals sample and for all deals sample. Hence support for target- 
affiliated analysts’ strategic behaviour is provided. These findings are in line with the ones 
presented in Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) study.
Support for hypothesis that large deal value increases the effect of affiliation is provided 
especially for target-affiliation, which is in line with the findings in Kolasinski and Kothari 
(2007) study. In addition, evidence for my hypothesis that the European regulation change in 
2003 resulted in lower recommendations is provided. Lower recommendations are issued by 
both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts, which is in line with a previous study by Kadan et al. 
(2008) considering the implications of the regulation changes in the US. Interestingly, 1 find 
also differing results compared to the Kadan et al. (2008) study. Kadan et al. (2008) find that
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analyst recommendation scale has converted from five categories to three after the regulation 
change in 2002. Similar effect can not be seen in my results.
Evidence that stock financing affects affiliated analysts’ recommendations is provided as 
well. My results suggest that in my sample of deals with at least 50% stock financing, 
acquirer-affiliated analysts issue more low level recommendations compared to my all deals 
sample. My results imply in addition, that target-affiliated analysts issue more high level 
recommendations in deals with stock financing. These findings contradict the ones in 
Kolasinski and Kothari (2007) study. In addition, they are not in line with the selection bias 
hypotheses.
Finally, the most puzzling results are related to analyst report timing in relation to the M&A 
deal announcement. My results suggest that the recommendation issuing time and quarter 
have an effect on the recommendation levels. In fact, the most statistically meaningful factors 
in the analysis on recommendation revisions seem to be the interaction terms between the 
analyst affiliation and report timing in relation to the M&A deal announcement. This is the 
case especially for acquirer-affiliation.
For both recommendation levels and revisions, my results suggest that both acquirer- and 
target-affiliated analysts issue lower level recommendations prior and higher level 
recommendations after the deal announcement for both stock deals and all deals sample. 
Hence evidence for target-affiliated analysts’ strategic recommendation behaviour is provided 
but the findings contradict the strategic recommendation behaviour hypothesis related to 
acquirer-affiliation. On the contrary, these results imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts may 
aim to enhance their reputation.
However, when model 6 is run to study the report timing quarter more precisely, evidence 
that acquirer-affiliated analysts issue lower level recommendations merely during quarter -2Q 
in stock deal sample and quarter -3Q in all deals sample is found. In addition, the results on 
recommendation revisions imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts’ downgrades might be 
concentrated on quarters -3Q and +3Q. My results suggest in addition that the 
recommendations and revisions issued during other quarters are positive. In fact, my results 
suggest that recommendations issued by acquirer-affiliated analysts during quarters -IQ prior 
and +1Q and +2Q after the deal announcement are positive and statistically significant which
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provides support for my strategie recommendation behaviour hypothesis on acquirer- 
affiliation as well. In addition, my results imply that acquirer-affiliated analysts upgrade 
acquirer’s stock during quarters IQ and 2Q after the deal announcement which provides 
support for my hypothesis that acquirer-affiliated analysts upgrade acquirer’s stock after the 
deal announcement. My results suggest in addition that report timing may explain the lower 
level recommendations issued by acquirer-affiliated analysts in stock deals as well.
Nevertheless, acquirer-affiliated results are mixed. On the other hand, acquirer-affiliated 
analysts’ lower level recommendations prior the deal announcement do not provide support 
for the strategic behaviour hypothesis or the selection bias hypothesis. On the contrary, it 
implies that acquirer-affiliated analysts may try to enhance their reputation by exploiting 
inside information about the deal and by issuing lower recommendations about the acquirer 
whose stock price they assume will deteriorate after the deal announcement. Then again, the 
higher recommendation levels issued during quarters - IQ, IQ and 2Q closer to the M&A deal 
announcement provide support for the strategic recommendation behaviour hypothesis.
To conclude, my results suggest that affiliated analysts’ recommendations might be biased 
compared to unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations. In addition, my results imply that the 
bias is dependent on the nature of the affiliation, i.e. acquirer-affiliated and target-affiliated 
analysts issue different recommendations compared to each other and to unaffiliated analysts, 
and that higher deal value increases the bias in affiliated analysts’ recommendations. 
Furthermore, European regulation changes had a diminishing effect on analysts’ 
recommendations. Additionally, my results suggest that the recommendation issuing time 
surrounding the M&A deal announcement has an effect on the recommendation level and on 
the probability of an upgrade or a downgrade. Clear conclusion on whether acquirer-affiliated 
analysts bias their recommendations in order to benefit their employers and client firms or 
themselves can not be drawn. However, my results provide evidence that target-affiliated 
analysts might act in the best interest of their client firms and employers.
6.3. Suggestions for further research
As discussed in the previous section, my results suggest that affiliated analyst may bias their 
recommendations. Hence it would be interesting to study whether the markets are able to
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detect this potential bias in affiliated analysts’ stock recommendations. This could be done by 
examining the short-term market reactions to both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ 
recommendations. In addition, it would be interesting to see whether affiliated analysts’ 
upgrades after the deal announcement perform better than unaffiliated analysts’, i.e. are they 
truly biased or do their recommendations contain superior information. A study of the long- 
run returns for affiliated analysts’ recommendations might shed light on that question. 
Additionally, the regulation changes during 2003 resulted in lower level recommendations. 
Studying the effect of regulation changes on market reaction to affiliated analysts 
recommendations would be interesting as well.
Ill
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